Why do Kyrgyzstan's regions remain undeveloped?
The administration has officially designated 2020 a year devoted to "regional development, the support of children, and the country's digitization." The two prior years also bore this labeling. Issues of development, self-sufficiency, and manageability in the regions are more acute than ever given the pandemic, the ensuing isolation – an isolation that is also internal – and the global economic crisis.
Exposing regional problems, events this year have also underlined the importance of the country's timely digitalization. Kyrgyzstan lags behind on a number of key indicators in this regard.
Issues of regional policy, including the interaction of the central authorities with local government bodies, are critical for any country. Coordination between these authorities ensures the exercise of power in every corner and facilitates feedback from the population. This process requires balance. It is important not to bend the instructions of the central government beyond acceptable limits and to follow general state policy; it is equally critical to listen to public opinion and not just blindly follow the directives of the center or carry them out "to the letter."
Ideally, administrative or territorial units should be capable of introducing various security measures for a certain period and have the capacity to develop in a comprehensive manner. This includes the ability of a unit to rely on its own resources.
Issues of regional policy, including the interaction of the central authorities with local government bodies, are critical for any country. Coordination between these authorities ensures the exercise of power in every corner and facilitates feedback from the population. This process requires balance. It is important not to bend the instructions of the central government beyond acceptable limits and to follow general state policy; it is equally critical to listen to public opinion and not just blindly follow the directives of the center or carry them out "to the letter."
Ideally, administrative or territorial units should be capable of introducing various security measures for a certain period and have the capacity to develop in a comprehensive manner. This includes the ability of a unit to rely on its own resources.
The pandemic and the ensuing border closures have highlighted this need. In the current crisis, the country and its future are reliant on the ability of the regions to be self-sufficient and to develop on their own.
This report is an attempt to review and reflect on several matters related to the regions:
- 1The historical role and place of the local authorities
in the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic and in other relevant laws. - 2The conception of regional development.
- 3Financial and budgetary issues, as well as other matters,
related to regional policy. - 4Suggestions and recommendations for developing Kyrgyzstan's regional policy and optimizing it.
1
Regions and local government: a retrospective
Kyrgyzstan inherited its administrative and territorial divisions from the Soviet era. Its regionalization is based on a system developed under different conditions and with distinct social and economic relationships. That said, districts, regional administrations, and local forms of self-government – the ayyl okmotu or village administration – have changed since independence, together with their powers, for various reasons.
Currently, the Kyrgyz Republic consists of 7 regions, 40 districts, 2 cities of republican subordination. The country has 31 cities and 453 ayil aimaks
Currently, the Kyrgyz Republic consists of 7 regions, 40 districts, 2 cities of republican subordination. The country has 31 cities and 453 ayil aimaks
Cities are subdivided according to republican, regional, and district significance. 33.8% of the population lives in cities according to natsstatkom (the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic), with 66.2% residing in rural areas. The entire population of the country consists of local communities exercising their rights through local government.
Republic
Region
District
Ayyl aymak
(village territory)
(village territory)
Oblasts, and especially districts, are marked by imbalances in population numbers and occupied territory. This is evident from map 1. The population of the Kara-Suu district in the Osh region is 390 thousand,[1] for example, which exceeds the populations of both the Talas (247 thousand[2]) and Naryn (274 thousand[3]) regions. There is a similar disproportion at the ayyl aymak and district levels, with some having populations barely over 20 thousand (those in the Chon-Alai district of the Osh region and in the Toguz-Torous and Chatkal districts of Jalal-Abad). The Shark and Nariman village territories in the Karasu district, in contrast, have populations nearing 45 thousand, while in Naryn there are territories with populations below one thousand.
There is a clear disparity in populations at the district and village territory levels, with no apparent balance to the allocations.
Studying the structure of regional and local authorities is impossible without analyzing constitutional norms, including those sections addressing local state administrations and forms of self-government at the village level. This analysis shows that the most significant changes occurred after 2000.
The 1993 Constitution
stipulated that kenesh – or council – chairmen would exercise executive power at the village and ayyl level. They were initially subordinate to the government, though subsequent revisions provided no concrete guidance on this issue. The first constitution specified that local state administrations would exercise executive power in regions, districts, and cities. Amendments introduced in 2003, however, mandated something different, with local state administrations expected to exercise executive power in the territory of the corresponding administrative-territorial unit.
In the 1993 Constitution, there is language to the effect that issues of local importance (up to the regional level) would be decided by the kenesh, a local council elected by residents. Deputies of these councils had the right to remove heads of local territorial units with a 2/3 vote of no confidence, but this right was abrogated by amendments made in 2006.
The 2010 Constitution
outlined a new definition for local self-government: "local self-government is an actual right guaranteed by the Constitution; it provides local communities the possibility to solve local issues on their own – under their own responsibility – and in accordance with their own interests." There is also the accepted norm according to which state bodies have no right to interfere with powers of local self-government that are stipulated by law.
The role of local authorities was significantly revised after 2010; their powers were strengthened, and this corresponded with a decrease in accountability. There was a concomitant reduction in the role of district and regional authorities, including through the removal of budgetary flows and the reduction of their rights and powers vis-a-vis local self-government.
2
Analysis of the Regional Policy "Concept"
The government adopted its Regional Policy Concept by decree on March 31, 2017. Articulated with the period 2018-2022 in mind, it was developed "to create a basic structure that would make it possible to prepare detailed development programs for specific regions and settlements in the medium and long term." [4]
The aim of the Regional Policy Concept is "to ensure the accelerated development of the country's regions – both socially and economically – and to improve the welfare of the population by directing critical developmental assistance to adjacent areas, including any corresponding village territories and centers of growth." [5]
The Concept also has an analytical component, stressing that the republic lacks "an effective, integrated approach to regional development, with the task of improving the social life of the population on the ground never having been addressed."
The aim of the Regional Policy Concept is "to ensure the accelerated development of the country's regions – both socially and economically – and to improve the welfare of the population by directing critical developmental assistance to adjacent areas, including any corresponding village territories and centers of growth." [5]
The Concept also has an analytical component, stressing that the republic lacks "an effective, integrated approach to regional development, with the task of improving the social life of the population on the ground never having been addressed."
It also spoke to key regional issues, including:
- Problems in developing efficient regional management
- Degradation of infrastructure
- Inefficiencies in public administration
- Problems of local self-government
- Shortcomings in investment policy
- Issues in developing small and medium-sized businesses and partnerships
between public and private entities - An inability to respond effectively to emergency situations
The Concept proposes numerous measures to shore up regional policy:
Bishkek, Osh, Karakol, Balykchy, Naryn, Kochkorka, Tokmok, Kara-Balta, Talas, Isfana, Batken, Kadamzhay, Uzgen, Kara-Suu, Sary-Tash, Tash-Kumyr, Kara-Kul, Jalal-Abad, Kerben, and Kochkor-Ata. The policy indicates that the role of these settlements "is to accelerate the formation of necessary infrastructure – social, economic, communication, and logistical – on its own territory," the assumption being that development will then radiate outward across the country.
· Education (the cities of Bishkek and Osh)
· Construction (the Chuy and Osh oblasts)
· Tourism (the Issyk-Kul region)
· Petrochemical (the region of Jalal-Abad)
· Agro-industrial (most territories, apart from certain regions and cities)
· Animal husbandry (the Chuy, Naryn oblasts)
· Transport and communications (the Narın, Osh, Issyk-Kul, and Chuy oblasts, and the city of Bishkek)
· Medical and pharmaceutical (the city of Bishkek)
· Construction (the Chuy and Osh oblasts)
· Tourism (the Issyk-Kul region)
· Petrochemical (the region of Jalal-Abad)
· Agro-industrial (most territories, apart from certain regions and cities)
· Animal husbandry (the Chuy, Naryn oblasts)
· Transport and communications (the Narın, Osh, Issyk-Kul, and Chuy oblasts, and the city of Bishkek)
· Medical and pharmaceutical (the city of Bishkek)
It points to the budget as a source of funding, including investments flowing in from the Russian-Kyrgyz Development Fund.
To create twenty critical "nodes" or centers:
Regional specialization in accordance with various "clusters":
1
2
3
Strengthening interregional ties and advocates efforts to combat the influence – cultural and informational – of neighboring states (Uzbekistan, the Republic of Tatarstan and the Republic of Kazakhstan).
State institutions, local self-government, and civil society should all be involved in implementing the Concept and participate in the mechanisms created to realize it like the National Council for Regional Development. The Council was meant to prepare draft laws on regional development and to amend existing regulations "On the administrative and territorial structure of the Kyrgyz Republic" and "On the mountainous territories of the Kyrgyz Republic." There was also a proposal to maintain balance between local self-government and republic authorities. The Concept acknowledged the anemic state of local self-government while also noting that most local forms of authority had lost their ability to develop independently. It further stressed the need to increase public involvement in oversight functions vis-a-via forms of local self-government and advocated greater input in their decision-making processes. A single body, operating within the framework of the National Council and in accordance with methods it approved, was meant to develop all laws and regulations.
Kyrgyzstan's Regional Policy Concept has clear goals set forth in capable prose. This is clear. It additionally offers unambiguous recommendations for solving the country's regional development issues. That said, it primarily exists only in theory and on paper, with its main goals never having been achieved.
Kyrgyzstan's Regional Policy Concept has clear goals set forth in capable prose. This is clear. It additionally offers unambiguous recommendations for solving the country's regional development issues. That said, it primarily exists only in theory and on paper, with its main goals never having been achieved.
Данные за 2018 год
The data in the above graph shows Bishkek to have the highest gross regional product per person, with the Issyk-Kul region ranking second. It also demonstrates a continuing, critical issue: the wide disparity among regions in social and economic development. The Concept offers very little in relation to questions of responsibility among certain authorities. It does not explicitly address implementation or the specific structures responsible for generating and implementing reforms.
It is important to emphasize inconsistencies in executing regional policies – this is not only a matter of concern for oblasts and centers of development – but also the lack of consideration regarding the interdependence of economic development, social policy, and security, though the most important drawback, at least in our view, is financial, with this aspect of regional reforms being particularly incomplete.
It is important to emphasize inconsistencies in executing regional policies – this is not only a matter of concern for oblasts and centers of development – but also the lack of consideration regarding the interdependence of economic development, social policy, and security, though the most important drawback, at least in our view, is financial, with this aspect of regional reforms being particularly incomplete.
3
Issues of regional financing
Kyrgyzstan transitioned from a budget with four tiers – republic-oblast-region-village territory – to one with two – republic-village territory – at the beginning of the 2000s. Proponents of the reform maintained that budget funds never reached village territories, which, in turn, had no influence over their distribution. The two-tier budget was meant to allow local self-governments the opportunity to optimize the management of their revenues and budget expenditures, though it also raises a series of questions:
83% of village territories are subsidized, according to official data from 2019. [6] It is important to note this. The remaining 17%, as a rule, have large markets, mining operations, or enterprises. There is the Karasu market, for example, in the Savaysk and Saray village territories of the Osh oblast from which, in successful years, village administrations draw more than a million som each.[7] Other village administrations with comparable populations in the same region had budgets of only 10 million som.
There is also the example of the Bekmoldoevsky village territory in the Talas region, which received 170 million som from the company Vostok-geologodobycha, which acquired the rights to develop the Jeruy deposit. The district and the region received the same amount. [8] It is reasonable to ask why the Bekmoldoevsky village government received this sum while neighboring village administrations were heavily subsidized.
There is the additional example of the Kyzyl-Kyy cement plant. The city of Kyzyl-Kyy, which is part of the Batken region, and the Kulatovsky village administration, which belongs to the Nookat district in the Osh region, have been fighting over tax deductions from the plant for more than 10 years, with many of the disputes having reached the country's legislature and Supreme Court. [9]
There are questions as to the fairness of how income is distributed to village territories, especially when these incomes do not derive from the leadership of the local administration or its residents.
If we expand this analysis to cities, Bishkek draws tax revenues from companies that operate across the country simply because Kumtor, [10] Gazprom, [12] and various other enterprises – mining, trading, and transport – are registered in the city.
The share of equalization grants provided to cities will decrease according to the local self-government development plan for 2018-2023. City incomes grew by an average of 40% from 2015 to 2016, while the income of village administration increased by only 12 %, a disparity that results in unequal conditions for development and leads to discrimination against certain citizens and local governments. Residents of "poor" local self-governments do not have access to the services and opportunities that residents of "rich" local self-governments enjoy, with stimulus grants and grants meant to level the playing field having little effect. The declared principles of equal development and equal access to good and services simply do not work in practice.
There is also the example of the Bekmoldoevsky village territory in the Talas region, which received 170 million som from the company Vostok-geologodobycha, which acquired the rights to develop the Jeruy deposit. The district and the region received the same amount. [8] It is reasonable to ask why the Bekmoldoevsky village government received this sum while neighboring village administrations were heavily subsidized.
There is the additional example of the Kyzyl-Kyy cement plant. The city of Kyzyl-Kyy, which is part of the Batken region, and the Kulatovsky village administration, which belongs to the Nookat district in the Osh region, have been fighting over tax deductions from the plant for more than 10 years, with many of the disputes having reached the country's legislature and Supreme Court. [9]
There are questions as to the fairness of how income is distributed to village territories, especially when these incomes do not derive from the leadership of the local administration or its residents.
If we expand this analysis to cities, Bishkek draws tax revenues from companies that operate across the country simply because Kumtor, [10] Gazprom, [12] and various other enterprises – mining, trading, and transport – are registered in the city.
The share of equalization grants provided to cities will decrease according to the local self-government development plan for 2018-2023. City incomes grew by an average of 40% from 2015 to 2016, while the income of village administration increased by only 12 %, a disparity that results in unequal conditions for development and leads to discrimination against certain citizens and local governments. Residents of "poor" local self-governments do not have access to the services and opportunities that residents of "rich" local self-governments enjoy, with stimulus grants and grants meant to level the playing field having little effect. The declared principles of equal development and equal access to good and services simply do not work in practice.
At present, district and regional administrations control little beyond the coordination of state programs and their implementation. Regional financial departments collect the draft budgets of local governments and receive applications for grants, both for incentive and equalization funds. Districts and oblasts have practically no budgets. The budgets of many districts are often smaller – if not always, then in many cases – than the village administrations within it. [12] These funds primarily cover employee salaries and, beyond this, are part of the republican budget, given the two-tier system now in place. It is evident that district and regional administrations do not have the authority or means to work effectively.
Formal inspections by village administrations determine all work in the regions, though there are no mechanisms for monitoring the effectiveness and efficiency of local government bodies. Even at the country level, stakeholders might have to discuss an unfinished school or repair two kilometers of road in some village territory.
This situation means that regional and district structures do not participate in generating viable ideas for regional development or in outlining strategic regional proposals. Village administrations set goals and objectives at the local level, and even outline five-year plans, with entire republican departments monitoring their implementation and taking credit for their achievements. The state will receive more than 400 minor "strategic" plans as a result, demonstrating the lack of integrated planning in developing territories with state and local administrative interaction.
There are numerous mini tenders in Kyrgyzstan: workers on infrastructure projects separately carrying out repairs over hundreds of meters, even though the purchase of goods and services in such small quantities requires large margins. Regional and republican structures simultaneously monitor every operation of local self-governments. It is far more profitable for businesses to participate in large projects, the economic impact of which is disproportionately higher than that of numerous local "strategic" plans, none of which are coordinated. It is a real question whether money spent at the level of village territories is expended rationally.
Formal inspections by village administrations determine all work in the regions, though there are no mechanisms for monitoring the effectiveness and efficiency of local government bodies. Even at the country level, stakeholders might have to discuss an unfinished school or repair two kilometers of road in some village territory.
This situation means that regional and district structures do not participate in generating viable ideas for regional development or in outlining strategic regional proposals. Village administrations set goals and objectives at the local level, and even outline five-year plans, with entire republican departments monitoring their implementation and taking credit for their achievements. The state will receive more than 400 minor "strategic" plans as a result, demonstrating the lack of integrated planning in developing territories with state and local administrative interaction.
There are numerous mini tenders in Kyrgyzstan: workers on infrastructure projects separately carrying out repairs over hundreds of meters, even though the purchase of goods and services in such small quantities requires large margins. Regional and republican structures simultaneously monitor every operation of local self-governments. It is far more profitable for businesses to participate in large projects, the economic impact of which is disproportionately higher than that of numerous local "strategic" plans, none of which are coordinated. It is a real question whether money spent at the level of village territories is expended rationally.
Policy measures are meant to maintain the status quo of the regions because of this. They are not addressed to issues of development.
4
Problems of regional development
It should be noted, in fairness, that regional development problems are not solely linked to financing and intergovernmental relations. There is a combination of factors – the degradation of inherited infrastructure, corruption, localism, lack of regional jobs, etc. – working against the region-wide integrated development of the country, though the absence of job opportunities in the regions is a key factor in outmigration and in the decline of the labor force. The leaders of Kyrgyzstan showed a preference for their "own" after independence, recruiting based on loyalty and clannishness. This suppressed the emergence of strong regional leaders and elites. At the same time, the central government generally suppressed well-known regional leaders who played on populist ideas the moment they emerged (for example, Beknazarov during the Aksy events, [13] and M. Myrzakmatov from Osh[14] ), citing separatist fears.
The absence of strong, authoritative regional elites made regionalism and its agenda a political tool, one used for populist purposes in election campaigns or to protect personal political and economic interests. Regional problems remain unsettled as a result, with the regions finding little sympathy toward their needs in the center. In terms of planning at the rural level, there are more than 400 proposals in play, all of which need to be coordinated and built into a republic-wide strategy. The number of issues of local importance has increased in recent years. This is a clear trend, with many local self-governments being tasked with preventing domestic violence or providing legal education to citizens. Employees in executive bodies at the local level concentrate on exercising delegated state powers, as a result; this, in turn, negatively impacts efforts to resolve issues of local importance or to implement quality solutions.[15]
There is a de facto weakness in the managerial pyramid: the district and regional levels are weak and bear no direct responsibility for the implementation of budgets, with their function reduced to that of a transmission link. This process is likely to worsen, with local administrations carrying out directives from the center "to the letter" and without considering regional opinions and interests.
The absence of strong, authoritative regional elites made regionalism and its agenda a political tool, one used for populist purposes in election campaigns or to protect personal political and economic interests. Regional problems remain unsettled as a result, with the regions finding little sympathy toward their needs in the center. In terms of planning at the rural level, there are more than 400 proposals in play, all of which need to be coordinated and built into a republic-wide strategy. The number of issues of local importance has increased in recent years. This is a clear trend, with many local self-governments being tasked with preventing domestic violence or providing legal education to citizens. Employees in executive bodies at the local level concentrate on exercising delegated state powers, as a result; this, in turn, negatively impacts efforts to resolve issues of local importance or to implement quality solutions.[15]
There is a de facto weakness in the managerial pyramid: the district and regional levels are weak and bear no direct responsibility for the implementation of budgets, with their function reduced to that of a transmission link. This process is likely to worsen, with local administrations carrying out directives from the center "to the letter" and without considering regional opinions and interests.
The lack of experience with initiatives and projects at the regional level means it is difficult to imagine any region independently resolving issues on the ground. This has been particularly true during the quarantine and with the subsequent isolation.
powers of village territories, though there was no effort to take their actual potential into account.
At the level of the Constitution and the laws, the head of the village administration and the local kenesh is formerly equal to the head of government and the Jogorku Kenesh, with republican and district authorities being unable to interfere in the work of local self-governments. They also lack sufficient financial resources to carry out the tasks assigned to them, with many of these tasks – even those originating from legislative bodies – being impossible to implement on the ground.
There are small projects at the village territory level and expansive, country-wide endeavors like the North-South Highway, with the regions largely being ignored. The country lacks experience in solving regional problems because of this and the bureaucratic apparatus is accustomed to thinking through problems at the village territory level. Reports and plans derive from village administrations as opposed to regional structures. This suggests the state is working to strengthen ties among municipalities rather than among regions.
At the level of the Constitution and the laws, the head of the village administration and the local kenesh is formerly equal to the head of government and the Jogorku Kenesh, with republican and district authorities being unable to interfere in the work of local self-governments. They also lack sufficient financial resources to carry out the tasks assigned to them, with many of these tasks – even those originating from legislative bodies – being impossible to implement on the ground.
There are small projects at the village territory level and expansive, country-wide endeavors like the North-South Highway, with the regions largely being ignored. The country lacks experience in solving regional problems because of this and the bureaucratic apparatus is accustomed to thinking through problems at the village territory level. Reports and plans derive from village administrations as opposed to regional structures. This suggests the state is working to strengthen ties among municipalities rather than among regions.
5
Recommendations
There is a clear need to reform relations among the center, the regions, and local self-governments and to revise inter-budgetary interactions and rethink administrations and territories. It is nevertheless critical to keep two conditions in focus when implementing any change: reforms, first of all, should be carried out in stable periods or in periods with predictable social and economic indicators; administrative and territorial reforms, secondly, should address content as opposed to form – it should not be about just redrawing lines but closely examining the internal structures of administrations and territories and the measures they take.
It would be advisable to transition from a four-tier system – republic-region-district-village territory – to a system with three levels, including the republic, the aimak (an expanded region), and village territories.
This will optimize management, stimulate regional growth, and contribute to developing infrastructure and making quality services available.
The aimak – translated from Kyrgyz, it denotes a region, district, or territory – would be fully functional with its own budget, kenesh or council, development plan, specialization, and specific management team. It would have a planning horizon of 10 years and be able to implement its plans. It would additionally have the capacity to be isolated for at least a month without losing control of its population and with sufficient resources to provide essential services and to maintain security, broadly conceived in terms of safeguarding medicine, education, food and the social order .
The aimaks – and not cities – should be centers of growth as this will allow synergistic and comprehensive regional development. It is important in this regard to endow aimak administrations with the right to develop comprehensive regional plans to ensure no time is wasted on inter-municipal negotiations. The state apparatus at present has to recruit specialists for administrations in 7 regions, 40 districts, and in 14 cities of republic and regional significance. This is not to mention 17 cities of district significance and more than 400 village territories. It would be much easier to equip several aimaks, including the capital, with high-performing administrative teams.
The aimak – translated from Kyrgyz, it denotes a region, district, or territory – would be fully functional with its own budget, kenesh or council, development plan, specialization, and specific management team. It would have a planning horizon of 10 years and be able to implement its plans. It would additionally have the capacity to be isolated for at least a month without losing control of its population and with sufficient resources to provide essential services and to maintain security, broadly conceived in terms of safeguarding medicine, education, food and the social order .
The aimaks – and not cities – should be centers of growth as this will allow synergistic and comprehensive regional development. It is important in this regard to endow aimak administrations with the right to develop comprehensive regional plans to ensure no time is wasted on inter-municipal negotiations. The state apparatus at present has to recruit specialists for administrations in 7 regions, 40 districts, and in 14 cities of republic and regional significance. This is not to mention 17 cities of district significance and more than 400 village territories. It would be much easier to equip several aimaks, including the capital, with high-performing administrative teams.
Revise the existing two-tier budget from "republic-local self-government" to "republic-aimak."
This will allow plans and strategies which incorporate regional needs and characteristics and make it possible to allocate budgets for improving infrastructure and services. Aimak administrations will be able to plan projects on a broader scale and significantly help businesses if they have expanded powers and appropriate budgets.
It seems logical to reconsider enlarging the role of representative authorities, creating regional councils – aimak keneshter – to replace the ayyl keneshter or village councils and endowing them with similar rights and obligations. This will ensure protection for the rights of citizens while also allowing them a voice and input in larger projects. It will also stimulate the development of local elites and sustainable local interests. Regional councils will no longer be decorative and have the means to resolve significant issues in the manner of existing village councils.
We propose retaining executive functions in some cities and in all villages and village territories: the receipt and initial verification of documents, appeals, complaints, etc. for all public and local services (city services or services at the aimak level); provision of certain services, including the collection and verification of operational information; assistance in ensuring the fulfillment of certain tasks (though political and managerial responsibility will remain at the aimak level); doing explanatory work on specific issues and managing funds allocated by the aimaks. For detailed work on administrative and territorial reforms, including creating aimaks capable of fulfilling the functions we have outlined here, it is necessary to study their needs, specializations, and economic interests in depth.
Conclusion
Kyrgyzstan's regional policy, despite the initially encouraging goals of its Concept, has failed to develop due to a lack of resources, corruption, internal political struggles, and weak staffing, though it is also owing to the lack of thought that went into implementation and to imbalances inherent in the management system.
The inability to effectively articulate regional interests means authorities have to direct all their energies to solving each problem that emerges at the local level. The simultaneous assignment of multilevel tasks to municipal employees makes work inefficient. It is not expedient to have them do two tasks at once: to constantly be in contact with the public and provide daily services, or to perform the functions of a "front office," while at the same time tasking them with the planning and development work usually associated with "rear office" functions. There should be regional officials instead with their own budgets, responsibilities, and clearly defined assessment indicators.
The country will not be dependent on the capital and a few large cities if its regions are self-sufficient centers of growth. The introduction of a country-wide state of emergency – or an emergency in one or several regions – would not cause the collapse of economic growth if this were the case and it would significantly mitigate the negative consequences of such a situation.
The inability to effectively articulate regional interests means authorities have to direct all their energies to solving each problem that emerges at the local level. The simultaneous assignment of multilevel tasks to municipal employees makes work inefficient. It is not expedient to have them do two tasks at once: to constantly be in contact with the public and provide daily services, or to perform the functions of a "front office," while at the same time tasking them with the planning and development work usually associated with "rear office" functions. There should be regional officials instead with their own budgets, responsibilities, and clearly defined assessment indicators.
The country will not be dependent on the capital and a few large cities if its regions are self-sufficient centers of growth. The introduction of a country-wide state of emergency – or an emergency in one or several regions – would not cause the collapse of economic growth if this were the case and it would significantly mitigate the negative consequences of such a situation.
About authors
- Alibek MukambaevPresident of the Agency
for Strategic Initiatives "Eurasia"Alibek has ten years of experience in various international organizations and is the author of numerous articles on political and economic processes in Central Asia. He has worked with more than 80 village governments as a regional employee with international organizations in the Batken, Jalal-Abad, Osh, and Naryn areas. - Nargiza Muratalievaa PhD and associate professorNargiza is the editor of analytical materials for the Cabar.asia platform and has more than 50 publications in peer-reviewed journals on social, political, and geopolitical processes in Central Asia.
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© 2020 CABAR.asia
This material has been prepared as part of the «Giving Voice, Driving Change — from the Borderland to the Steppes Project». The opinions expressed in the material do not reflect the position of the editorial board or donor
Photo: Tian Shan Mountains by Thomas Depenbusch / CC BY
Kochkor by Thomas Depenbusch / CC BY
Kyrgyzstan by noviceromano / CC BY
This material has been prepared as part of the «Giving Voice, Driving Change — from the Borderland to the Steppes Project». The opinions expressed in the material do not reflect the position of the editorial board or donor
Photo: Tian Shan Mountains by Thomas Depenbusch / CC BY
Kochkor by Thomas Depenbusch / CC BY
Kyrgyzstan by noviceromano / CC BY