Central Asia and mineral resources
HOW DID THE REGION BECOME A FIELD OF BATTLE FOR RESOURCES?
The Central Asian region plays an important role in the world system of mineral trade as well as in the system of energy supply to the industry of developed countries. The reasons for this include the following:
- The region has large mineral reserves, especially oil and gas.
- The region has large mineral reserves, especially oil and gas.
BACKGROUND
Between 1991 and 2020, the Central Asian region had a very modest share in the world economy (no more than 0.3%). However, for all these 30 years, the region was considered by the world economy as an important source of raw materials.
According to conservative estimates in the mid-2010s, the total volume of oil reserves in Central Asian countries reached 15-31 billion barrels (about 7% of total world resources), the total volume of natural gas reserves - 230-360 trillion cubic meters (7% of total world reserves*). The region can be included in the top 10 largest world gold producers (if we consider it as an integral entity with common trade rules).
The states of the Central Asian region have developed mining, metallurgical and chemical industries, fuel and energy complexes, which are concentrated mainly in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
The approach to mineral extraction is different in these countries. Turkmenistan's economy is almost entirely dependent on gas sales, Uzbekistan covers its fuel needs through domestic production, but is not a typical victim of the "Dutch disease", i.e. does not base its economy solely on the sale of minerals, Kazakhstan seems to have formed a hybrid model of economy, free from full statehood, but, due to internal specifics, is still extremely dependent on oil and gas sales.
The importance of the region in terms of resource supply is disproportionately greater than the modest role it plays in the global economy.
*It is worth noting that the estimate of the world's mineral reserves is not a fixed value either.
According to conservative estimates in the mid-2010s, the total volume of oil reserves in Central Asian countries reached 15-31 billion barrels (about 7% of total world resources), the total volume of natural gas reserves - 230-360 trillion cubic meters (7% of total world reserves*). The region can be included in the top 10 largest world gold producers (if we consider it as an integral entity with common trade rules).
The states of the Central Asian region have developed mining, metallurgical and chemical industries, fuel and energy complexes, which are concentrated mainly in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
The approach to mineral extraction is different in these countries. Turkmenistan's economy is almost entirely dependent on gas sales, Uzbekistan covers its fuel needs through domestic production, but is not a typical victim of the "Dutch disease", i.e. does not base its economy solely on the sale of minerals, Kazakhstan seems to have formed a hybrid model of economy, free from full statehood, but, due to internal specifics, is still extremely dependent on oil and gas sales.
The importance of the region in terms of resource supply is disproportionately greater than the modest role it plays in the global economy.
*It is worth noting that the estimate of the world's mineral reserves is not a fixed value either.
- Most of the region's resources are available for exploitation by foreign companies. / To understand the context of the situation - the African region, due to its size, is much richer in minerals than Central Asia, but the extraction of African minerals and their transportation is much more expensive and complicated.
- The Central Asian region has already established routes for safe transportation of minerals (some of them as far back as the Soviet era). The region's potential as a transit zone for any goods is unique and comparable only to the potential of developed regions such as, for example, the European Union.
- When the borders were opened for free export of minerals (mid-1990s), the post-Soviet countries of the region still had a strong enough base of specialists for the extraction and transportation of minerals. Any foreign company could start developing local deposits with the support of a pool of low-paid but qualified local performers.
- To a certain point, the most mineral-rich countries in the region were extremely stable politically and represented predictable and reliable partners.
Factors complicating the initially favorable picture include the fact that:
- Central Asia is surrounded on three sides by three large states (China, Russia and Iran), positioning themselves as peculiar competitors of the developed countries of the European Union and the United States.
- The Central Asian region has already established routes for safe transportation of minerals (some of them as far back as the Soviet era). The region's potential as a transit zone for any goods is unique and comparable only to the potential of developed regions such as, for example, the European Union.
- When the borders were opened for free export of minerals (mid-1990s), the post-Soviet countries of the region still had a strong enough base of specialists for the extraction and transportation of minerals. Any foreign company could start developing local deposits with the support of a pool of low-paid but qualified local performers.
- To a certain point, the most mineral-rich countries in the region were extremely stable politically and represented predictable and reliable partners.
Factors complicating the initially favorable picture include the fact that:
- Central Asia is surrounded on three sides by three large states (China, Russia and Iran), positioning themselves as peculiar competitors of the developed countries of the European Union and the United States.
- The mineral transportation routes are within the zones of influence (or under the direct control) of the above-mentioned states.
- Russia and China themselves are (for various reasons) major buyers of minerals and seek to establish their own playing conditions in the region's markets.
- Russia and China themselves are (for various reasons) major buyers of minerals and seek to establish their own playing conditions in the region's markets.
Thus, the Central Asian region has been in an absolutely unique situation for more than 30 years.
Due to its post-colonial status, it had a disproportionately large (for newly created states) technical potential for the extraction and transportation of minerals.
On the other hand, the weakness of the newborn political systems, the absence (at the time of independence) of its own developed financial elite, the strong influence of authoritarian neighbors, and corrupt governments that were not interested in upholding the interests of their own citizens, created conditions for numerous acts of corruption and violations of the law.
On the other hand, the weakness of the newborn political systems, the absence (at the time of independence) of its own developed financial elite, the strong influence of authoritarian neighbors, and corrupt governments that were not interested in upholding the interests of their own citizens, created conditions for numerous acts of corruption and violations of the law.
"THREADS" PROJECT is an analytical project about how processes in one Central Asian country affect the other countries of the region.
THEME OF THE ISSUE:
CENTRAL ASIA AND MINERAL RESOURCES. HISTORY OF THE FIGHT FOR RESOURCES.
FIGHT FOR RESOURCES
MUKHTAR JAKISHEV. THE MAN WHO DID NOT GIVE RUSSIA THE URANIUM DEPOSITS OF KAZAKHSTAN.
Year of 2020. Near the gates of the colony in Semey, at least fifty people were gathered, all making noise, talking, waiting for something - or rather for someone.
On this day - March 19, 2020 - a noticeably aged Mukhtar Jakishev, the former head of the Kazatomprom national company, who spent more than 10 years in prison, was released on parole.
He is greeted with writings on the placards and T-shirts, "Freedom to Jakishev". When the gates finally open, two black jeeps drive out. People run when they see Mukhtar Jakishev in one of them.
On this day - March 19, 2020 - a noticeably aged Mukhtar Jakishev, the former head of the Kazatomprom national company, who spent more than 10 years in prison, was released on parole.
He is greeted with writings on the placards and T-shirts, "Freedom to Jakishev". When the gates finally open, two black jeeps drive out. People run when they see Mukhtar Jakishev in one of them.
total.kz
- Mukhtar JakishevFormer head of Kazatomprom, recollections in one of his interviews"When I was released and people greeted me at the gate of the prison camp I was imposed a condition that I should ride past without stopping. Then I said: "no, then I'm not going out or I'm going to walk". These were not my jeeps, they were jeeps of the National Security Committee".
In the eyes of some Kazakhstanis, Mukhtar Jakishev is a national hero. Why?
In his youth, Mukhtar Jakishev followed in his father's footsteps - who was head of the Department of Criminalistics at KazSU. Jakishev studied at this university for three years and then transferred to the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MIFI) - at that time it was almost the limit of dreams of Russian-speaking students. The relations of the future elite of Kazakhstan were formed in Moscow. At one time Mukhtar Jakishev, Mukhtar Ablyazov [a major political figure in Kazakhstan, oppositionist, and politically persecuted in the future], Rakhat Aliyev [former number two man in Kazakhstan, former son-in-law of the once all-powerful head of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, found hanged in 2015 in a prison cell in Vienna] and Dariga Nazarbayeva - daughter of Nursultan Nazarbayev - studied there. Judging by the stories, they all kept in touch with each other.
Then - postgraduate studies
Then - postgraduate studies
Mukhtar Jakishev and Mukhtar Ablyazov*. Photo by kz.expert
- Mukhtar JakishevFormer head of Kazatomprom, recollections in one of his interviews"In the 1990s, I was in Moscow, working at 38 Petrovka Street [the famous building of the Main Department of Internal Affairs of the Moscow City Executive Committee], I had a laboratory there, I was a graduate student at the Moscow Engineering Institute. I was engaged in laser fingerprinting. We had a contract with the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs to provide scientific assistance to the internal affairs bodies," Mukhtar Jakishev tells his friend Armanzhan Baitassov.
In 1993, Mukhtar Jakishev returned to Kazakhstan and started doing business together with Bulat Abilov (who would later become an advisor to Nazarbayev and then go into opposition) and Rakhat Aliyev.
In general, everything was going to Mukhtar Jakishev to take some high post in the government: experience and connections with people who were in very good standing at that time contributed to this.
But he went to the Kazatomprom nuclear company - not the most bread-and-butter place at that time, with a huge potential for development.
In general, everything was going to Mukhtar Jakishev to take some high post in the government: experience and connections with people who were in very good standing at that time contributed to this.
But he went to the Kazatomprom nuclear company - not the most bread-and-butter place at that time, with a huge potential for development.
According to Mukhtar Jakishev, at that time there was little appetite for the uranium industry in Kazakhstan: the price was extremely low - $11 per pound [0.45 kilograms].
- Mukhtar JakishevFormer head of Kazatomprom"At that time uranium was an outsider in reality. I came to Kazatomprom - the price of uranium was low, $11 per pound, and it was falling. And there was no end to this fall, because 60% of the market was supplied from warehouses. The Canadians, the French were sitting on this market. The Soviet Union was collapsing, we popped up with our uranium, the market was feverish, the U.S. imposed anti-dumping - 112% duties. The Europeans also protected their market. Uranium was in surplus, pressure was mounting, missile disarmament was underway, and uranium mines were closing all over the world. The only ones left were those who can handle this small price. Stockpiles were plentiful until 2014. I came in 1998 - the price was 11-12, 2001 - 6.70. This was already the lowest of the low," Jakishev said in an interview with Orda news.
That's when a milestone in Jakishev's life began, because of which he spent 11 years in prison and became a national hero.
Суд над Мухтаром Джакишевым в городе Семей. Фото Радио Азаттык
The trial of Mukhtar Jakishev in the city of Semey. Photo by Radio Azattyk There were many stories. Kazatomprom, for example, was engaged in speculation of uranium prices. In the early noughties, Jakishev made a report in London, in which he warned of holes in the principles of pricing - even small companies had the opportunity to speculate in the market. No one listened to him. So he decided to lead this adventure.
- Mukhtar JakishevFormer head of Kazatomprom"Kazatomprom rewrote all existing contracts from the long-term price to the spot price, i.e. the price at immediate delivery, which the buyers gladly agreed to: the spot price is usually lower than the long-term price....// We got an average of $600 million out of it. It's been called a blind spurt, but that's nonsense. It was speculation on a pricing imperfection that we warned about in 2004, but because we were not listened to, we made money on it in 2005."
Jakishev names Frank Giustra, a Canadian businessman who invested in uranium deposits in Kazakhstan, as the architect of the scheme in which Kazatomprom participated. He came to the Kazakhstani market, according to Jakishev, at the invitation of Karim Massimov.
No one in the public eye was following Jakishev: he wasn't involved in politics, he wasn't epathetic - he was, you might say, just doing business. And it did not work out in the government - he held the post of deputy energy minister for only three months, and then, as he says, "everyone was fed up with me, because I was breaking the rules of the game".
"Fed up with" – let's say. But you can't put him in prison for that, can you?
No one in the public eye was following Jakishev: he wasn't involved in politics, he wasn't epathetic - he was, you might say, just doing business. And it did not work out in the government - he held the post of deputy energy minister for only three months, and then, as he says, "everyone was fed up with me, because I was breaking the rules of the game".
"Fed up with" – let's say. But you can't put him in prison for that, can you?
... in May 2009 he was detained by NSC officers. Interrogation. Closed court without explanation. 14 years in prison. Jakishev's trial was held in strict secrecy and even the text of the verdict was not made public.
...in all interviews he was asked: why were you imprisoned? It seems to be a simple question. But no one has an exact answer yet. /With the exception, perhaps, of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who, according to Jakishev, gave the order./ The former head of Kazatomprom himself has some guesses. He believes that he prevented the Russians from taking uranium mines from Kazakhstan.
Shortly before the arrest, Russian representatives came to Kazatomprom and offered to sign an agreement: Kazakhstan would transfer its shares in five deposits to Russia, and in return Russia was considering (only considering!) the possibility of transferring to Kazakhstan a share in an enrichment plant. With the help of this plant, Kazakhstan could produce uranium pills and sell them, say, to Japan.
- Mukhtar JakishevFormer head of Kazatomprom, recollections in one of his interviews"I said: either we both consider the possibility of transferring, or we both transfer. In the end, we signed an agreement in which we create five 50/50 joint ventures for a thousand tons of production with Rosatom, and they transfer to us a 50% stake in the enrichment plant with a capacity of 5 million rubles".
According to Jakishev, he insisted on a favorable deal for both sides - everyone gets what they lack.
But Mukhtar Jakishev was imprisoned. Kazakhstan did not get a stake in the plant, but Russia got five deposits for free. Four of the deposits were given to the Rosatom state corporation and one to a private individual, a Russian, Vasily Anisimov.
- Mukhtar JakishevFormer head of Kazatomprom, recollections in one of his interviews"I was surprised when the Russian side said: is it okay if we take four deposits and give one to a private person? I said: it is your stake, do what you want with it. They take four for themselves and give one to Anisimov. And then they buy it from him. I said: I don't care, it's Russian cuisine, if they like doing such things, let them do it. Then Anisimov first appeared in Kazakhstan's uranium industry. They apparently liked it: they took it for free, resold it, and shared the money somewhere".
Already in our time, in 2022, a rather similar unfavorable for Kazakhstan deal was made - Rosatom bought 49% of shares of Stepnogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine (SMCC) - the founder of some sections of Budenovskoye. At that time, British companies were selling their shares, Kazatomprom had the right to buy them, but voluntarily gave up its priority right to buy the shares. People began to be indignant: why did they give the Kazakhstani deposit to the Russians? Some indirectly began to claim that the sale to the Russians was lobbied by the government.
- Nurlan ZhumagulovDirector of the Union of Oil Service Companies of Kazakhstan"The shareholders of the combine were: GANBERG UK LTD - 60%, GEXIOR UK LTD - 40%. The contract for exploration was concluded in 2015, the combine has 49%, all the financial risks in the exploration works of JV Budenovskoye LLP on the sites #6 and #7 was assumed by the combine. In 2021, the company signed a production contract. In 2022 foreign partners (GANBERG and GEXIOR) decided to sell their share. The main question was only - who was behind GANBERG and GEXIOR? And how did they manage to acquire the most valuable asset for a pittance? The media reported that Alexander Klebanov was behind the GANBERG stake. And who was the beneficiary of GEXIOR? The same people (Maria Mylonova and Aristos Iacovou) represented the interests of these two companies at the shareholders' meetings. One thing was clear - the Rosatom deal (for $1.3 billion) was authorized with Zhana Kazakhstan [the government - NB]. But it was possible to cancel the initial deal and gain an additional $1.3 billion for KAP. We assume who the true beneficiaries are, but since we do not have the facts, we will refrain from doing so.
Let's return to the possible reasons for Jakishev's arrest. In 2009, there was another player in Kazakhstan's uranium field - Uranium One, a company in which Frank Giustra, mentioned above, was involved at the time. Uranium One was a joint venture company that at the time had the right to develop some of Kazakhstan's deposits.
In 2009, when the Kazakhstani government wanted the Russian entities, whose representative was a relative of Vladimir Shkolnik [Kazakhstani statesman - NB], to buy a stake in Uranium One, Jakishev proposed a contract with the Japanese company Toshiba. But the Kazakhstani government did not approve the deal with Japan. On May 21, 2009, Mukhtar Jakishev was arrested, and on May 22, 2009, Vladimir Shkolnik was recommended by the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan for the vacated position of the head of NAC Kazatomprom JSC.
Already in June 2009 (immediately after Jakishev's arrest), Atomredmetzoloto (ARMZ), a subsidiary of Rosatom, acquired a 16.6% stake in Uranium One in exchange for a 50% stake in the Karatau uranium mining project jointly with Kazatomprom. In 2010, Uranium One received a 50% and 49% stake in Kazakhstan's Akbastau and Zarechnoye uranium mining projects. In exchange, Russia's ARMZ increased its stake in Uranium One to 51%.
In 2009, when the Kazakhstani government wanted the Russian entities, whose representative was a relative of Vladimir Shkolnik [Kazakhstani statesman - NB], to buy a stake in Uranium One, Jakishev proposed a contract with the Japanese company Toshiba. But the Kazakhstani government did not approve the deal with Japan. On May 21, 2009, Mukhtar Jakishev was arrested, and on May 22, 2009, Vladimir Shkolnik was recommended by the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan for the vacated position of the head of NAC Kazatomprom JSC.
Already in June 2009 (immediately after Jakishev's arrest), Atomredmetzoloto (ARMZ), a subsidiary of Rosatom, acquired a 16.6% stake in Uranium One in exchange for a 50% stake in the Karatau uranium mining project jointly with Kazatomprom. In 2010, Uranium One received a 50% and 49% stake in Kazakhstan's Akbastau and Zarechnoye uranium mining projects. In exchange, Russia's ARMZ increased its stake in Uranium One to 51%.
The 2009 and 2010 deals turned Uranium One, managed by Russians and Russian-affiliated businessmen, into one of the most powerful uranium mining companies in the world. And Kazakhstan, the first state in the world in terms of uranium production, has effectively become an appendage of Russian uranium policy. Helpless and pathetic.
- Mukhtar JakishevFormer head of Kazatomprom, recollections in one of his interviews"I was arrested just on the day we were supposed to meet with [Russian President Vladimir] Putin. They were flying in from Japan, it didn't work out there. I talked to Yoshio Mochizuki-san, the vice minister - he started apologizing very much that it was his fault because he had a very tough conversation with Putin and "he must have gotten angry and you were immediately put in prison". I told him that it wasn't his fault, that I had a lot more faults besides Putin".
No one can say anything exactly about the reasons for the arrest - Jakishev was personally (in his words) told that it was "Nazarbayev's order". Officially, he was convicted for "supplying automated fire control systems". And unproven bribes.
- Mukhtar JakishevFormer head of Kazatomprom, recollections in one of his interviews"Recently I found in my group an open letter that I wrote on February 21, 2012. Here I cite the substantive charge: according to this charge, I am guilty of taking a bribe from an unidentified person in an unidentified place at an unidentified time and in an unidentified amount. Next, I will try to read you a citation from the judge: "All this shows that Jakishev is a sophisticated, insidious criminal who leaves no trace of his criminal activity and therefore deserves the most severe punishment". This is the direct speech of the judge".
The only conclusion we can draw with a certain degree of certainty is that Jakishev's arrest coincided almost completely with the expansion of Rosatom's subsidiaries into Kazakhstan's deposits. Expansion, during which Rosatom-controlled companies took leading positions in the world uranium sales market.
FIGHT FOR RESOURCES
WHAT HAPPENED TO MINERAL RESOURCES IN CENTRAL ASIA BEFORE 2022?
As we have already mentioned, Central Asia has large mineral reserves. The region also acts as a hub in the China-Russia-Europe link.
Over the years, Central Asia has been selling off mineral deposits and entering into unfavorable contracts in exchange for investment and political immunity.
In previous longreads we have shown that a number of countries in the region are almost completely dependent on the sale of minerals.
In order to assess the extent of other countries' influence on the production and marketing of these minerals, we will have to find out who owns the licenses for prodcution of oil, gas, and gold deposits and how the contracts were negotiated, as well as who controls the oil and gas pipelines that carry the fuel that feeds the country to other countries.
Over the years, Central Asia has been selling off mineral deposits and entering into unfavorable contracts in exchange for investment and political immunity.
In previous longreads we have shown that a number of countries in the region are almost completely dependent on the sale of minerals.
In order to assess the extent of other countries' influence on the production and marketing of these minerals, we will have to find out who owns the licenses for prodcution of oil, gas, and gold deposits and how the contracts were negotiated, as well as who controls the oil and gas pipelines that carry the fuel that feeds the country to other countries.
FIGHT FOR RESOURCES
KAZAKHSTAN
Kazakhstan is the owner of the largest mineral reserves in the region. Much more importantly, Kazakhstan is a democratic state where most processes are relatively transparent and can be traced and analyzed (the other two owners of large mineral reserves - Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan - went as far back as in the 1990s to make their economies as state-owned as possible).
Kazakhstan is one of the largest suppliers of a number of minerals in the world. According to the World's top exports 2021, the country ranks 15th in the world in oil exports, 11th in copper exports and 1st in uranium exports. The territory is also home to some of the world's largest reserves of tungsten: Kazakhstan is among the top three countries in terms of tungsten reserves, but the mining sector is extremely underdeveloped. In 2018, there were reported plans to revive the industry, but in 2019 it became known that the largest tungsten deposit was sold to the Chinese company Xiamen Tungsten and actually fell out of the sphere of influence of national operators.
Looking at the export data, we see that Kazakhstan is at least 56% dependent on the sale of minerals. The largest share of exports is crude oil. In 2021, Kazakhstan sold $31.1 billion worth of it. According to the Committee of National Statistics, oil was mainly sold to Italy and the Netherlands.
Kazakhstan is one of the largest suppliers of a number of minerals in the world. According to the World's top exports 2021, the country ranks 15th in the world in oil exports, 11th in copper exports and 1st in uranium exports. The territory is also home to some of the world's largest reserves of tungsten: Kazakhstan is among the top three countries in terms of tungsten reserves, but the mining sector is extremely underdeveloped. In 2018, there were reported plans to revive the industry, but in 2019 it became known that the largest tungsten deposit was sold to the Chinese company Xiamen Tungsten and actually fell out of the sphere of influence of national operators.
Looking at the export data, we see that Kazakhstan is at least 56% dependent on the sale of minerals. The largest share of exports is crude oil. In 2021, Kazakhstan sold $31.1 billion worth of it. According to the Committee of National Statistics, oil was mainly sold to Italy and the Netherlands.
Due to fluctuations in oil prices in monetary terms Kazakhstan has still not reached the level of exports of a decade ago.
The important elements of the whole system are the companies that produce oil and the refineries that turn crude oil into something more valuable.
There are three major refineries in Kazakhstan - Atyrau, Pavlodar and Shymkent. The first two belong to the national oil and gas operator KazMunayGas, and the last one to PetroKazakhstan, whose history we will discuss below.
In terms of deposits, Kazakhstan's largest oil reserves are in Kashagan (estimated at 1-2 billion tons), Tengiz (0.75-1.125 billion tons), Karachaganak (1.35 trillion m3 of gas and 1.2 billion tons of oil), Uzen (1.1 billion tons), Kalamkas (67.6 million tons) and Zhetybay (68 million tons).
Nine companies produce most of Kazakhstan's oil.
There are three major refineries in Kazakhstan - Atyrau, Pavlodar and Shymkent. The first two belong to the national oil and gas operator KazMunayGas, and the last one to PetroKazakhstan, whose history we will discuss below.
In terms of deposits, Kazakhstan's largest oil reserves are in Kashagan (estimated at 1-2 billion tons), Tengiz (0.75-1.125 billion tons), Karachaganak (1.35 trillion m3 of gas and 1.2 billion tons of oil), Uzen (1.1 billion tons), Kalamkas (67.6 million tons) and Zhetybay (68 million tons).
Nine companies produce most of Kazakhstan's oil.
Chinese and Russian companies by production volume, according to official data, are poorly represented – China's CNPC produced 6.7 million tons in 2021, and Russia's Lukoil - 2.9. Kazakhstan's KazMunayGas owns a larger volume of production, but according to experts, this does not mean that the national company receives the most revenue.
- Jusan AnalyticsOverview of Kazakhstan's oil and gas industry"Despite the high diversification and significant share of the national company's participation, the majority of oil and gas production is controlled by foreign partners. Annually about 35% of export revenues are paid to foreign investors".
Ownership of deposits in Kazakhstan is a rather tentative concept. Many Kazakhstani (at first glance) companies are controlled by foreigners. Many foreign companies are actually controlled by Kazakhstanis or natives of Kazakhstan.
How have the rules in Kazakhstan's mining market evolved over 20 years? To understand this, let's look at some case studies.
CASE 1
KARAGANDA METALLURGICAL PLANT
On November 17, 1995, Ispat International UK entered into an agreement with the Republic of Kazakhstan to privatize Karaganda Metallurgical Plant SJSC (Karmet), which in the future would become ArcelorMittal Temirtau.
This deal has already raised Ispat International from 32nd to 14th place in the world in terms of steel production in ten years. A number of researchers say that it was the privatization of Karmet that allowed Lakshmi Mittal to build up his empire and make ArcelorMittal the second* largest company in the world.
*It is worth considering that the company produces more than just steel.
This deal has already raised Ispat International from 32nd to 14th place in the world in terms of steel production in ten years. A number of researchers say that it was the privatization of Karmet that allowed Lakshmi Mittal to build up his empire and make ArcelorMittal the second* largest company in the world.
*It is worth considering that the company produces more than just steel.
How did this privatization take place? Is there any reason to claim that Lakshmi Mittal seized Karmet's assets illegally?
What happened was obviously legal. But it was legal within the framework of the laws of 1995 (very imperfect at that time). The late Rakhat Aliyev (son-in-law of former President Nazarbayev, who fled the country and hid from his all-powerful father-in-law for many years) wrote in his book "Godfather-in-law" that Lakshmi Mittal transferred half of the shares and 50 million dollars to Nursultan Nazarbayev when acquiring the plant. However, this fact is not confirmed by anything.
In 2022, Kazakh politician Bulat Abilov, who at that time was a non-staff advisor to Nursultan Nazarbayev, said that the deal was criminal. According to him, Lakshmi bought the Karaganda Metallurgical Plant for $200 million, when in reality it was worth more than $3 billion.
In 2022, Kazakh politician Bulat Abilov, who at that time was a non-staff advisor to Nursultan Nazarbayev, said that the deal was criminal. According to him, Lakshmi bought the Karaganda Metallurgical Plant for $200 million, when in reality it was worth more than $3 billion.
Here we have to recall that the redistribution of mining and processing facilities in the Central Asia region took place in actually newborn countries, rich in resources and developed infrastructurally and technically (which made them extremely attractive for investment), but completely underdeveloped politically. Countries where there was no developed practice of public discussions and involvement of citizens in making decisions important for the fate of the country.
Let's consider the thesis of underestimated cost of privatization. The cost of privatization of Karmet was 225 million dollars. And it had to be paid in four (!) installments from May 17, 1996 to November 17, 1999.
At the same time, according to the documents presented by the researchers of this issue, Karmet received about 40-45 million dollars a month for steel deliveries. And this was not theoretical money, but money under contracts already signed* by the plant. The cost of privatization of the plant was the income from steel deliveries abroad for less than half a year. In other words, the plant worked and sold its products, and Mr. Mittal was engaged in their sale (while the plant already had established sales channels and buyers) and paid for the cost of the plant with this money.
*Before privatization.
*Before privatization.
Thus, Lakshmi Mittal in theory could pay 225 million dollars to Kazakhstan without investing a penny of his own money, solely at the expense of only half a year's profit of the plant itself.
It can be assumed that, if the existing rate of steel shipments abroad was maintained, Lakshmi Mittal would have made a profit of between 1 and 2 billion dollars in the three and a half years that were set aside for the payment of 225 million. An extremely lucrative deal for Mr. Mittal.
It should be noted that Karmet also had some kind of debts (about 50 million dollars in debts to creditors and a little over 10 million dollars in wage arrears), but these debts did not significantly change the overall picture. The Karaganda Metallurgical Plant was privatized for dozens of times less than its true value.
It should be noted that Karmet also had some kind of debts (about 50 million dollars in debts to creditors and a little over 10 million dollars in wage arrears), but these debts did not significantly change the overall picture. The Karaganda Metallurgical Plant was privatized for dozens of times less than its true value.
Obviously, Lakshmi Mittal received Karmet on highly favorable terms. The people of Kazakhstan did not profit from this deal. We could characterize the terms of the purchase by the apt homely phrase "they also paid him for taking it".
Most researchers point out that Karmet was an extremely favorable purchase also due to the availability of all necessary infrastructure. Electricity (Ekibastuz), coke for the blast furnaces (Karaganda), water for cooling the units - all of these were within walking distance of the plant and were connected to it by a well-developed railroad network.
Under the terms of the agreement, the new owner of the plant received preferences in the form of the lowest prices in Kazakhstan for raw materials, electricity and railroad tariffs.
Oleg Gusev, a researcher of the Karaganda Metallurgical Plant privatization, points out that Lakshmi Mittal was provided assurance that fines for violation of environmental legislation would not exceed the amount of 200 million tenge.
Oleg Gusev, a researcher of the Karaganda Metallurgical Plant privatization, points out that Lakshmi Mittal was provided assurance that fines for violation of environmental legislation would not exceed the amount of 200 million tenge.
According to Oleg Gusev, if the amount exceeds 200 million tenge, the state is obliged to reimburse the Buyers' losses.
In 2018, ArcelorMittal Temirtau paid 1.4 billion fines for violation of environmental legislation. According to the contract - the state was to compensate it for the amount of losses exceeding 200 million tenge.
Among the pros of selling Karmet, it is often pointed out that Arcelor Mittal Temirtau JSC bears a significant social responsibility. But this thesis should be taken into account that the old Karmet carried a much greater burden of maintaining the city infrastructure, and Arcelor Mittal Temirtau JSC got rid of most of these kindergartens, recreation parks and sports centers.
In 2018, ArcelorMittal Temirtau paid 1.4 billion fines for violation of environmental legislation. According to the contract - the state was to compensate it for the amount of losses exceeding 200 million tenge.
Among the pros of selling Karmet, it is often pointed out that Arcelor Mittal Temirtau JSC bears a significant social responsibility. But this thesis should be taken into account that the old Karmet carried a much greater burden of maintaining the city infrastructure, and Arcelor Mittal Temirtau JSC got rid of most of these kindergartens, recreation parks and sports centers.
In 2005, Lakshmi Mittal bought out the Ukrainian company Krivorozhstal for $4.8 billion (it was initially sold to Ukrainian oligarchs for $800 million, but then Yulia Tymoshenko's government insisted on reprivatization). Now, years later, it is quite difficult to compare the value of these two facilities, but it is worth noting that at the peak of production, both Karmet and Kryvorizhstal produced about 6 million tons of steel per year. These are comparable figures, which suggests that the real value of Karmet should have been close to that of Kryvorizhstal.
CASE 2
"PetroKazakhstan"
PetroKazakhstan is a Canadian oil company (city of Calgary, province of Alberta), all business of which is concentrated in Kazakhstan. The key shareholder of the Canadian company PetroKazakhstan is the Chinese company PetroChina.
At a certain moment* the company owned the second largest explored oil and gas reserves in Kazakhstan (after ChevronTexaco's Tengiz-Chevroil). In 2005 PetroKazakhstan (after years of fight for control over its assets) was acquired by China National Petroleum Corporation and then in 2006 transferred to PetroChina.
*Reserves are periodically updated.
At a certain moment* the company owned the second largest explored oil and gas reserves in Kazakhstan (after ChevronTexaco's Tengiz-Chevroil). In 2005 PetroKazakhstan (after years of fight for control over its assets) was acquired by China National Petroleum Corporation and then in 2006 transferred to PetroChina.
*Reserves are periodically updated.
BACKGROUND
A small company, Hurricane Hydrocarbons (founded in 1981) initially operated in Western Canada. In 1991, it became a development partner in the Kyzylkiya, Aryskum, Maibulak and South Kumkol deposits in South Kazakhstan, which rapidly relocated the center of the company's operations to Kazakhstan.
In 1996, the company bought the Yuzhneftegaz JSC and 50% stakes in Kazgermunay and Turgay Petroleum from the government. The latter was a joint venture between the governments of Kazakhstan and Russia. These acquisitions and the use of Canadian technology made Hurricane Hydrocarbons one of the largest players in Kazakhstan's oil production market.
However, already in 1999 the company was on the verge of bankruptcy. All of the company's oil production at the time passed through refineries owned by Central Asian Industrial Holdings N.V. (CAIH), an offshore branch of Kazkommertsbank (KKB), Kazakhstan's leading private banking group, which used its monopoly on oil refining to inflate prices and pressure Hurricane Hydrocarbons.
The company was saved from bankruptcy by Canadian businessman Bernard Isotier, a shareholder of Hurricane Hydrocarbons. He successfully negotiated a merger with Central Asian Industrial Holdings N.V. /Factually, we can say that this deal had the character of an aggressive merger, during which the largest group of financiers in Kazakhstan got a stake in a foreign company, but did not completely force foreign partners out of business. This merger opened new opportunities for Hurricane Hydrocarbons./
In 1999-2000 Hurricane Hydrocarbons acquired 88.4% of Shymkentnefteorgsintez OJSC (now PetroKazakhstan Oil Products LLP), which owned the most modern oil refinery in the country at that time - Shymkent Refinery (160,000 barrels per day).
Since 2001, the company, which had become a significant player not only in the production market but also in the oil refining market of Kazakhstan, became the object of a battle between the owners and the government of Kazakhstan. According to media reports at the time, the Kazakh government tried to buy the shares "for a ridiculously low price", and a year before that "armed mercenaries occupied the refinery and held the staff at gunpoint until a peace deal was declared". Later, the company was included in the list that it must contribute money to the National Fund of Kazakhstan (the main fund that serves as a source of transfers for the Republic's budget).
In 2003, Hurricane was renamed PetroKazakhstan to reflect that all of its operations are in that country.
In 2003, the company was the subject of a successful state-sponsored attack. The attack included fines and mass protests against environmental and labor law violations.
In June 2005, PetroKazakhstan announced that it had been approached about a possible takeover or merger. There were two possible suitors - a Russian-backed subsidiary of India's ONGC and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which the Kazakhstani government finally sided with.
As a result, PetroKazakhstan became the largest foreign acquisition of a Chinese company in 2005. On August 21, 2005, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) bought the company for $4.18 billion through CNPC International Ltd. (CNPCI), a wholly owned subsidiary of China National Oil & Gas Exploration and Development Corp. (CNODC)
In 1996, the company bought the Yuzhneftegaz JSC and 50% stakes in Kazgermunay and Turgay Petroleum from the government. The latter was a joint venture between the governments of Kazakhstan and Russia. These acquisitions and the use of Canadian technology made Hurricane Hydrocarbons one of the largest players in Kazakhstan's oil production market.
However, already in 1999 the company was on the verge of bankruptcy. All of the company's oil production at the time passed through refineries owned by Central Asian Industrial Holdings N.V. (CAIH), an offshore branch of Kazkommertsbank (KKB), Kazakhstan's leading private banking group, which used its monopoly on oil refining to inflate prices and pressure Hurricane Hydrocarbons.
The company was saved from bankruptcy by Canadian businessman Bernard Isotier, a shareholder of Hurricane Hydrocarbons. He successfully negotiated a merger with Central Asian Industrial Holdings N.V. /Factually, we can say that this deal had the character of an aggressive merger, during which the largest group of financiers in Kazakhstan got a stake in a foreign company, but did not completely force foreign partners out of business. This merger opened new opportunities for Hurricane Hydrocarbons./
In 1999-2000 Hurricane Hydrocarbons acquired 88.4% of Shymkentnefteorgsintez OJSC (now PetroKazakhstan Oil Products LLP), which owned the most modern oil refinery in the country at that time - Shymkent Refinery (160,000 barrels per day).
Since 2001, the company, which had become a significant player not only in the production market but also in the oil refining market of Kazakhstan, became the object of a battle between the owners and the government of Kazakhstan. According to media reports at the time, the Kazakh government tried to buy the shares "for a ridiculously low price", and a year before that "armed mercenaries occupied the refinery and held the staff at gunpoint until a peace deal was declared". Later, the company was included in the list that it must contribute money to the National Fund of Kazakhstan (the main fund that serves as a source of transfers for the Republic's budget).
In 2003, Hurricane was renamed PetroKazakhstan to reflect that all of its operations are in that country.
In 2003, the company was the subject of a successful state-sponsored attack. The attack included fines and mass protests against environmental and labor law violations.
In June 2005, PetroKazakhstan announced that it had been approached about a possible takeover or merger. There were two possible suitors - a Russian-backed subsidiary of India's ONGC and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which the Kazakhstani government finally sided with.
As a result, PetroKazakhstan became the largest foreign acquisition of a Chinese company in 2005. On August 21, 2005, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) bought the company for $4.18 billion through CNPC International Ltd. (CNPCI), a wholly owned subsidiary of China National Oil & Gas Exploration and Development Corp. (CNODC)
CASE 3
OBUKHOV MINING AND PROCESSING PLANT
Kazakhstan's largest producer of titanium-zirconium ores. The Obukhov titanium-zirconium deposit serves as the raw material base. It is located in Taiynsha district of North-Kazakhstan region.
In 2006 it was raided by Russian business structures.
For 10 years it was under the management of Russians and actually did not function.
In 2021, an extremely popular series of short films "MPP" was released in Kazakhstan, dedicated to the attempted forcible takeover of the plant. The main leitmotif of the film is an appeal to Kazakhstani officials: "Why sell the Motherland?".
In 2006 it was raided by Russian business structures.
For 10 years it was under the management of Russians and actually did not function.
In 2021, an extremely popular series of short films "MPP" was released in Kazakhstan, dedicated to the attempted forcible takeover of the plant. The main leitmotif of the film is an appeal to Kazakhstani officials: "Why sell the Motherland?".
BACKGROUND
In 2004, the Tioline company was established in the North-Kazakhstan region. The project was launched on the basis of the Lisakovsky Titanium-Zirconium Plant, which was already operating at that time and owned by Viktor Dolgalev, a citizen of Kazakhstan. Dolgalev created it together with Russian partners Dmitry Pyatkin and oligarch Alexander Freiman from Promarsenal LLC. Dolgalev contributed his plant as his share and the Russians contributed $5 million each.
In 2006, Dolgalev was dismissed as director in absentia and his stake in the authorized capital was diluted from 20 percent to 0.049 percent. What is happening can be assessed as an attempted forcible takeover.
In 2011, according to the decision of the Russian court, Viktor Dolgalev, a citizen of Kazakhstan, was deprived of participation in the Kazakh company. The reason for this decision was Dolgalev's refusal of the partners' offer to apply for a loan at 40% per annum. It was assumed that the loans would be arranged with credit organizations affiliated with his partners.
As a result of Viktor Dolgalev's dismissal, the MPP was brought to bankruptcy. In 2017, the plant employed 6 people (in 2006 - 313). In case of implementation of the approved work program for the operation of Obukhov Mining and Processing Plant for the period from 2007 to 2016 - the state could have received $46 million in taxes and 350 well-paid workplaces.
In 2015-2016, as a result of legal proceedings, Viktor Dolgalev managed to overturn the Russian court decision and regain control over the plant.
In 2020, a mass brawl took place on the territory of the plant (some of the founders tried to regain control over the plant by force).
From 2016 to 2021, an active fight for control over the plant continued. According to the management and employees of the enterprise, the authorities of the North-Kazakhstan region tried to transfer the enterprise to the Chinese with the support of the Russian shareholders of MPP represented by the owners of PromArsenal, entrepreneurs Dmitry Pyatkin and Alexander Freiman.
Despite the destruction of the enterprise's infrastructure and lawsuits, Obukhov MPP LLP continued its work. From 2017 to 2020, the main debts were repaid (including those accumulated by the previous management team that carried out the forcible takeover), and the enterprise was completely re-equipped. Despite the financial problems, the current management of the plant (protecting the enterprise from forcible takeover) managed to bring it to the stage of sustainable income generation.
In 2021, the employees of Obukhov MPP went on hunger strike. The reasons for the hunger strike were the termination of the contract with Tioline LLP by the Ministry of Industry and Infrastructural Development, non-payment of wages for two months, power cuts, arrest and seizure of the plant's cargo by the police. The employees of the MPP demanded to return the license for the development of the deposit to the MPP, to remove the Russian investors, and to reinstate the dismissed employees at the enterprise.
According to Viktor Dolgalev, the Russians initially entered into partnership with the plant in order to bankrupt it and take over the deposit.
In 2006, Dolgalev was dismissed as director in absentia and his stake in the authorized capital was diluted from 20 percent to 0.049 percent. What is happening can be assessed as an attempted forcible takeover.
In 2011, according to the decision of the Russian court, Viktor Dolgalev, a citizen of Kazakhstan, was deprived of participation in the Kazakh company. The reason for this decision was Dolgalev's refusal of the partners' offer to apply for a loan at 40% per annum. It was assumed that the loans would be arranged with credit organizations affiliated with his partners.
As a result of Viktor Dolgalev's dismissal, the MPP was brought to bankruptcy. In 2017, the plant employed 6 people (in 2006 - 313). In case of implementation of the approved work program for the operation of Obukhov Mining and Processing Plant for the period from 2007 to 2016 - the state could have received $46 million in taxes and 350 well-paid workplaces.
In 2015-2016, as a result of legal proceedings, Viktor Dolgalev managed to overturn the Russian court decision and regain control over the plant.
In 2020, a mass brawl took place on the territory of the plant (some of the founders tried to regain control over the plant by force).
From 2016 to 2021, an active fight for control over the plant continued. According to the management and employees of the enterprise, the authorities of the North-Kazakhstan region tried to transfer the enterprise to the Chinese with the support of the Russian shareholders of MPP represented by the owners of PromArsenal, entrepreneurs Dmitry Pyatkin and Alexander Freiman.
Despite the destruction of the enterprise's infrastructure and lawsuits, Obukhov MPP LLP continued its work. From 2017 to 2020, the main debts were repaid (including those accumulated by the previous management team that carried out the forcible takeover), and the enterprise was completely re-equipped. Despite the financial problems, the current management of the plant (protecting the enterprise from forcible takeover) managed to bring it to the stage of sustainable income generation.
In 2021, the employees of Obukhov MPP went on hunger strike. The reasons for the hunger strike were the termination of the contract with Tioline LLP by the Ministry of Industry and Infrastructural Development, non-payment of wages for two months, power cuts, arrest and seizure of the plant's cargo by the police. The employees of the MPP demanded to return the license for the development of the deposit to the MPP, to remove the Russian investors, and to reinstate the dismissed employees at the enterprise.
According to Viktor Dolgalev, the Russians initially entered into partnership with the plant in order to bankrupt it and take over the deposit.
FIGHT FOR RESOURCES
TURKMENISTAN
Turkmenistan is the largest exporter of natural gas in the region. It ranks 11th in the world in terms of production. Turkmenistan sells oil on a much smaller scale. In 2021, Turkmenistan exported $4.8 billion worth of gas and $808 million worth of oil.
Turkmenistan ranks 4th in the world in terms of natural gas reserves. London-based pricing agency Argus estimates that the country's natural gas reserves could reach 25 trillion cubic meters.
Turkmenistan's export revenues are 67.8% dependent on gas sales.
Turkmenistan ranks 4th in the world in terms of natural gas reserves. London-based pricing agency Argus estimates that the country's natural gas reserves could reach 25 trillion cubic meters.
Turkmenistan's export revenues are 67.8% dependent on gas sales.
In 2021, Turkmenistan sold 97% of its gas to China. Over 90% of gas from Turkmenistan has been sent to China for ten years. The contract on supplies to China was signed in 2010. In 2009 and earlier more than 80% of Turkmen gas was sent to Ukraine.
In 2009 and 2010, gas supplies dropped sharply due to political and economic disagreements. In 2011, they returned to the previous level (in terms of volumes), but smoothly began to change their destination.
In 2009 and 2010, gas supplies dropped sharply due to political and economic disagreements. In 2011, they returned to the previous level (in terms of volumes), but smoothly began to change their destination.
Turkmenistan's gas has been fought over for years between Russia, China and the EU.
One of the most significant gas conflicts in the region took place between Russia and Turkmenistan in the early 2010s. It illustrates the role of Turkmenistan, the relations between the countries and the ambitions of the countries involved.
One of the most significant gas conflicts in the region took place between Russia and Turkmenistan in the early 2010s. It illustrates the role of Turkmenistan, the relations between the countries and the ambitions of the countries involved.
BACKGROUND
2003. Turkmenistan and Russia signed a 25-year agreement on cooperation in the gas sector. Under the agreement, Gazprom Export OJSC and Turkmenneftegaz GTC concluded a long-term contract on export/import of Turkmen natural gas. Over time, Russia increased the capacity of its own production companies and there was no need for Turkmenistan's gas. However, according to experts, Russia was not satisfied with the fact that the gas was supplied to Ukraine and then to Europe.
2006. In January 2006, Azerbaijan Prime Minister Artur Rasizadeh proposes to Kazakhstan Prime Minister Danial Akhmetov that Kazakhstan's gas be exported to Turkey via the South Caucasus Pipeline and from there to the European market.
2007. Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan sign a trilateral agreement to export gas from Central Asia to Europe via the reconstructed and expanded western branch of the Central Asian Gas Pipeline. This finally puts an end to the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project, which could have made Turkmen gas supplies to Europe completely independent from the position of Russia and Iran.
2007. In 2007 Gazprom tries to monopolize the Central Asian gas market by offering to pay Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the European gas price of $160/1000m³. The price increase was linked to Russia's attempt to put financial pressure on Ukraine. However, shortly after this offer, "European prices" fell and Gazprom argued that prices in Central Asia should be reduced commensurately. Turkmenistan, however, continued to insist on the European gas price.
2008. Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister states that Iran opposes the construction of any underwater pipeline in the Caspian Sea due to environmental concerns.
2009. The gas conflict between Turkmenistan and Russia unfolds. Until 2009, Turkmenistan exported gas mainly to Ukraine, but then, due to Russian interference, decided to redirect export flows to China. This happened after Turkmenistan accused Russia of blowing up a branch of the Uzbekneftegaz gas pipeline. After that, Turkmenistan signed an agreement with the German energy company RWE AG to transport Turkmen gas to Europe and came to Prague to discuss the implementation of the Nabucco project, a gas pipeline that would connect the EU to Iran via Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan failed to reach an agreement with its European counterparts. Eventually, this year Turkmenistan redirected its gas export flow to China - taking out a loan to build the pipeline and a gas supply contract. Turkmenistan supplies China with about 60 billion m3 annually.
In the same year, the first line of the Central Asian Gas Pipeline appears, bringing gas from Central Asia to China. The first line appears in Turkmenistan.
2010. Turkmenistan agrees to reduce supply volumes for Russia. Volumes are reduced to 10 billion m3 at a price of $200-250 per m3.
2014. Turkmenistan continues to look for new gas markets. The country is focused on trade with the EU, but transportation requires a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, the construction of which requires the consent of all countries in the Caspian basin. Russia and Iran remain opposed to the construction. Officially they protest "for environmental reasons," but in reality, analysts say, Russia does not need a competitor in the European market, and Iran needs Turkmenistan's gas.
This year, China is completing a plant to prepare marketable gas at the Bagtyyarlyk site in Turkmenistan, where CNPC produces gas and sends it through the Central Asian gas pipeline.
2015. Turkmenistan claimed that Russia stopped paying its debts due to the imposed sanctions. Russian representatives accused Turkmenistan of "hysteria" and slander. Turkmenistan's media later stated that the experts were trying to destroy relations between "brotherly nations".
2017. Gas supplies to Iran are stopped - the latter delayed payment.
2019. Gas supplies from Turkmenistan to Russia are restarted. According to insiders, Turkmenistan had to "make serious concessions in the price to the Russian monopolist". The statement was made on the day the Turkmen government canceled gas, electricity, water and table salt benefits for 5.7 million citizens. According to an unnamed expert, the decision is related to the signing of the Caspian Convention.
"On August 12, the Caspian Convention was signed. In terms of security issues, Moscow ensured non-interference of outside forces in the Caspian Sea, but it had to make some concessions on the issue of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. At least Moscow has formally left the other member states the option of laying gas pipelines along the Caspian Sea bed. By restarting purchases of Turkmen gas, Moscow will help Turkmenistan in a difficult economic situation and will be able to dissuade Ashgabat from building the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline in the near future, and, most importantly, will make Turkmenistan dependent on Russia's own gas exports".
2020. Russia announced that it has doubled its gas imports from Turkmenistan. Representatives of Turkmenistan's Fuel and Energy Complex said that Russia's plans to build the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline to China is an attempt to force Turkmenistan out of the Chinese gas market.
2006. In January 2006, Azerbaijan Prime Minister Artur Rasizadeh proposes to Kazakhstan Prime Minister Danial Akhmetov that Kazakhstan's gas be exported to Turkey via the South Caucasus Pipeline and from there to the European market.
2007. Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan sign a trilateral agreement to export gas from Central Asia to Europe via the reconstructed and expanded western branch of the Central Asian Gas Pipeline. This finally puts an end to the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project, which could have made Turkmen gas supplies to Europe completely independent from the position of Russia and Iran.
2007. In 2007 Gazprom tries to monopolize the Central Asian gas market by offering to pay Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the European gas price of $160/1000m³. The price increase was linked to Russia's attempt to put financial pressure on Ukraine. However, shortly after this offer, "European prices" fell and Gazprom argued that prices in Central Asia should be reduced commensurately. Turkmenistan, however, continued to insist on the European gas price.
2008. Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister states that Iran opposes the construction of any underwater pipeline in the Caspian Sea due to environmental concerns.
2009. The gas conflict between Turkmenistan and Russia unfolds. Until 2009, Turkmenistan exported gas mainly to Ukraine, but then, due to Russian interference, decided to redirect export flows to China. This happened after Turkmenistan accused Russia of blowing up a branch of the Uzbekneftegaz gas pipeline. After that, Turkmenistan signed an agreement with the German energy company RWE AG to transport Turkmen gas to Europe and came to Prague to discuss the implementation of the Nabucco project, a gas pipeline that would connect the EU to Iran via Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan failed to reach an agreement with its European counterparts. Eventually, this year Turkmenistan redirected its gas export flow to China - taking out a loan to build the pipeline and a gas supply contract. Turkmenistan supplies China with about 60 billion m3 annually.
In the same year, the first line of the Central Asian Gas Pipeline appears, bringing gas from Central Asia to China. The first line appears in Turkmenistan.
2010. Turkmenistan agrees to reduce supply volumes for Russia. Volumes are reduced to 10 billion m3 at a price of $200-250 per m3.
2014. Turkmenistan continues to look for new gas markets. The country is focused on trade with the EU, but transportation requires a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, the construction of which requires the consent of all countries in the Caspian basin. Russia and Iran remain opposed to the construction. Officially they protest "for environmental reasons," but in reality, analysts say, Russia does not need a competitor in the European market, and Iran needs Turkmenistan's gas.
This year, China is completing a plant to prepare marketable gas at the Bagtyyarlyk site in Turkmenistan, where CNPC produces gas and sends it through the Central Asian gas pipeline.
2015. Turkmenistan claimed that Russia stopped paying its debts due to the imposed sanctions. Russian representatives accused Turkmenistan of "hysteria" and slander. Turkmenistan's media later stated that the experts were trying to destroy relations between "brotherly nations".
2017. Gas supplies to Iran are stopped - the latter delayed payment.
2019. Gas supplies from Turkmenistan to Russia are restarted. According to insiders, Turkmenistan had to "make serious concessions in the price to the Russian monopolist". The statement was made on the day the Turkmen government canceled gas, electricity, water and table salt benefits for 5.7 million citizens. According to an unnamed expert, the decision is related to the signing of the Caspian Convention.
"On August 12, the Caspian Convention was signed. In terms of security issues, Moscow ensured non-interference of outside forces in the Caspian Sea, but it had to make some concessions on the issue of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. At least Moscow has formally left the other member states the option of laying gas pipelines along the Caspian Sea bed. By restarting purchases of Turkmen gas, Moscow will help Turkmenistan in a difficult economic situation and will be able to dissuade Ashgabat from building the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline in the near future, and, most importantly, will make Turkmenistan dependent on Russia's own gas exports".
2020. Russia announced that it has doubled its gas imports from Turkmenistan. Representatives of Turkmenistan's Fuel and Energy Complex said that Russia's plans to build the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline to China is an attempt to force Turkmenistan out of the Chinese gas market.
Analyzing the proposed chronology, we can conclude that the attempt of the two governments of Turkmenistan to create an independent gas supply channel to Europe was met with clearly coordinated counter steps by Russia and Iran, which blocked Turkmenistan from creating its own gas pipeline to the EU. As a result, Turkmenistan was forced to divert its gas flows to China and fully subordinate its economy to the PRC's arrangements. The obvious beneficiary of this was China, which received the bulk of Turkmen gas. The indirect beneficiary is Russia, which managed to deprive the EU of a gas supplier independent of it. Turkmen gas is supplied to the EU only through mediation of Russia.
For 10 years, according to experts, Turkmenistan has been giving most of its revenues to China, paying off loans, including the loan taken to build the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, which it built to avoid dependence on Russia, according to analysts.
"China, in turn, according to analysts, buys gas at low prices and also receives gas as compensation for financing the construction of the Turkmen part of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline and building infrastructure for gas production and processing. Nevertheless, China buys significant volumes of gas, which in turn make up the lion's share of Ashgabat's exports," the media wrote.
In 2021, Turkmenistan's Deputy Prime Minister Shakhim Abdrakhmanov said that Turkmenistan had fully repaid the loan to China, allocated to finance its share in the project to build the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline and develop the Galkynysh gas field. According to experts' calculations, the debt amounted to about 10 billion dollars.
At the same time, due to the lack of reliable data, experts, including the World Bank, do not assess Turkmenistan's situation without guesswork. The World Bank, for example, does not include Turkmenistan (and Venezuela) in the World Economic Outlook report, which uses data on Turkmenistan's output, income and GDP growth.
Turkmenistan has been a big mystery for more than two decades.
"China, in turn, according to analysts, buys gas at low prices and also receives gas as compensation for financing the construction of the Turkmen part of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline and building infrastructure for gas production and processing. Nevertheless, China buys significant volumes of gas, which in turn make up the lion's share of Ashgabat's exports," the media wrote.
In 2021, Turkmenistan's Deputy Prime Minister Shakhim Abdrakhmanov said that Turkmenistan had fully repaid the loan to China, allocated to finance its share in the project to build the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline and develop the Galkynysh gas field. According to experts' calculations, the debt amounted to about 10 billion dollars.
At the same time, due to the lack of reliable data, experts, including the World Bank, do not assess Turkmenistan's situation without guesswork. The World Bank, for example, does not include Turkmenistan (and Venezuela) in the World Economic Outlook report, which uses data on Turkmenistan's output, income and GDP growth.
Turkmenistan has been a big mystery for more than two decades.
FIGHT FOR RESOURCES
UZBEKISTAN
Uzbekistan mainly exports manufactured goods, gold, services, energy and oil products. The share of gold in exports in 2021 is 24.7%, while industrial goods have a share of 26.1%.
In 2021, the country sold $4.1 billion worth of gold. Over 10 years, Uzbekistan exported 687 tons of gold, with 100 of them in 2020 (then Uzbekistan set a record for exports in monetary terms - the commodity was sold for $5.8 billion). This indicates growing production - in July 2020, for example, it was recognized as the largest seller of gold in the world (in the current quarter) and repeated this achievement again in February 2022.
In 2022, however, Uzbekistan stated that it does not intend to substitute Russian gold in the market. According to the Deputy Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade, the Central Bank almost entirely buys the gold produced - it has a priority right to do so. 60% of the Central Bank's international reserve is gold.
"That is, there is no such thing that [there was] marketing and [we] purposefully tried to occupy some niche in the big gold market," the Deputy Minister said.
The Central Bank of the country has been given the priority right to buy all locally refined gold.
According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), in 2020, almost all gold was sold to the UK (91.6%), where the largest international gold trading hub operates, while 7.4% of gold was sold to Russia.
In 2021, 52% of gold was exported to Switzerland and 39.1% to the UK. Uzbekistan hides data on final buyers. It is known that gold received, for example, in Switzerland, is sold on an international exchange.
"The country that bought the gold does not want to disclose how much it bought on the international market. Accordingly, it is not disclosed," the government says.
"That is, there is no such thing that [there was] marketing and [we] purposefully tried to occupy some niche in the big gold market," the Deputy Minister said.
The Central Bank of the country has been given the priority right to buy all locally refined gold.
According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), in 2020, almost all gold was sold to the UK (91.6%), where the largest international gold trading hub operates, while 7.4% of gold was sold to Russia.
In 2021, 52% of gold was exported to Switzerland and 39.1% to the UK. Uzbekistan hides data on final buyers. It is known that gold received, for example, in Switzerland, is sold on an international exchange.
"The country that bought the gold does not want to disclose how much it bought on the international market. Accordingly, it is not disclosed," the government says.
It is hard to say to whom and what belongs in Uzbekistan. Uzbek journalists mostly cite insider information.
Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company is Uzbekistan's largest mining enterprise. The enterprise mines gold, uranium and rare metals. The reserves of gold are 3700 tons. The company accounts for 10% of all industrial products produced in Uzbekistan and 18% of budget revenues. The company ranks third among the world's gold producers.
Gold production is about 80 tons per year with total production of 100 tons. The enterprise is also the leader in uranium exports in Uzbekistan.
Shareholder - UzAssets investment company of the State Assets Management Agency of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
In 2021, it became known that 10% of shares are likely to be sold
Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company is Uzbekistan's largest mining enterprise. The enterprise mines gold, uranium and rare metals. The reserves of gold are 3700 tons. The company accounts for 10% of all industrial products produced in Uzbekistan and 18% of budget revenues. The company ranks third among the world's gold producers.
Gold production is about 80 tons per year with total production of 100 tons. The enterprise is also the leader in uranium exports in Uzbekistan.
Shareholder - UzAssets investment company of the State Assets Management Agency of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
In 2021, it became known that 10% of shares are likely to be sold
Uzbek Metallurgical Plant is an enterprise of ferrous metallurgy in Uzbekistan.
It is a plant that has been taken over by oligarchs with the assistance of the authorities. Uzbek journalists rely heavily on insiders to tell such stories.
Based on the history of the enterprise, we tell why there is little similar information about other enterprises in Uzbekistan.
It is a plant that has been taken over by oligarchs with the assistance of the authorities. Uzbek journalists rely heavily on insiders to tell such stories.
Based on the history of the enterprise, we tell why there is little similar information about other enterprises in Uzbekistan.
In 2021, Uzbekistan turned from a seller into a buyer of gas from Gazprom. This was reported by the portal Gazeta.uz. A year before that Uzbekistan stopped selling gas to Russia because the country itself had run out of gas. In 2022, 51.7 billion cubic meters were produced, of which 46.4 billion went for domestic needs, and another 4 billion - for export to China.
Russia bought gas from Uzbekistan quite cheaply - $125 per thousand cubic meters (the low price was set as a kind of preference in exchange for Russian investments). Russia resold this gas in Kazakhstan.
Gazprom sells Uzbek gas in the southern parts of Kazakhstan, and in return receives feedstock for its gas processing plant in Orenburg on the Kazakh-Russian border in the north. The venture is heavily dependent on these foreign supplies, which average 8 billion cubic meters a year, and the substitution scheme, whereby these supplies are partially met by gas from Uzbekistan, remains in place, although the Kazakhs are gradually establishing their own gas supply in their southern regions, making imports from Uzbekistan less critical than they are now," RusEnergy partner Mikhail Krutikhin said in interview to The New Times.
Russia bought gas from Uzbekistan quite cheaply - $125 per thousand cubic meters (the low price was set as a kind of preference in exchange for Russian investments). Russia resold this gas in Kazakhstan.
Gazprom sells Uzbek gas in the southern parts of Kazakhstan, and in return receives feedstock for its gas processing plant in Orenburg on the Kazakh-Russian border in the north. The venture is heavily dependent on these foreign supplies, which average 8 billion cubic meters a year, and the substitution scheme, whereby these supplies are partially met by gas from Uzbekistan, remains in place, although the Kazakhs are gradually establishing their own gas supply in their southern regions, making imports from Uzbekistan less critical than they are now," RusEnergy partner Mikhail Krutikhin said in interview to The New Times.
FIGHT FOR RESOURCES
KYRGYZSTAN
Until 2022, the main item of legal* exports in Kyrgyzstan was gold. With total exports in 2021 amounting to $2.7 billion, gold accounted for $1.4 billion, or 51.8%.
*We wrote about gray export flows in our other review.
*We wrote about gray export flows in our other review.
In 2021, according to the Committee on National Statistics, gold was sold for 1.4 billion dollars - an all-time record amount for Kyrgyzstan. In 2020, gold exports amounted to 986 million dollars. This was probably due to the emergence of additional markets. If earlier Kyrgyzstan supplied over 90% of gold to the UK, in 2021 the export structure has changed: 51% went to the UK, 20% to Switzerland, 17% to the UAE, 4% to Thailand and 4% to China.
KUMTOR
Kumtor is the largest gold ore field in Central Asia with gold reserves of about 700 tons. Its share in Kyrgyzstan's GDP as of 2021 is 10%, its share in industrial production is 23% and its share of total exports is about 30%. This field is one of the reasons for the coups in the country and a crucial element of the criminal cases against the two deposed presidents.
Kumtor is the largest gold ore field in Central Asia with gold reserves of about 700 tons. Its share in Kyrgyzstan's GDP as of 2021 is 10%, its share in industrial production is 23% and its share of total exports is about 30%. This field is one of the reasons for the coups in the country and a crucial element of the criminal cases against the two deposed presidents.
BACKGROUND
1992. The right to develop the country's largest gold ore field without any tender was granted to the Canadian company Cameco. The shares of the company were mostly owned by the Canadian government.
Now it is the world's largest public uranium company.
2002. Cameco created a subsidiary company Kumtor Mountain Holdings Corporation. The company began to handle most of the issues.
2003. Kumtor Mountain Holdings Corporation was renamed Centerra Gold. One of the shareholders is Kyrgyzaltyn Government OJSC.
2004. Restructuring and investment agreement with the Kyrgyzstan government comes into effect. After the restructuring, Kyrgyzaltyn's share decreased to 33% and Cameco's share decreased to 66%. Kyrgyzaltyn transferred part of its shares due to outstanding debts to the International Finance Corporation (part of the World Bank) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Forensic economic examination, which was conducted in 2013, showed that at that time the share of Kyrgyzaltyn in Centerra Gold should have been 58.7%, not 33%, that is, it was understated by 25.7%, in monetary terms - by $171.5 million.
"International lawyers and auditors drew attention to some dubious payments that could be, in their opinion, a way to pay for the "services" of KR officials in concluding agreements on restructuring of the Kumtor project. The investigation and the verdict handed down by the court against the officials confirmed the facts of corruption," they wrote in 2013.
At that time, Askar Akayev was the President of Kyrgyzstan. After his overthrow and subsequent escape from the country, criminal cases were brought against him, including on Kumtor.
2009. Cameco sold its shares to its subsidiary Centerra Gold.
At that time, Kurmanbek Bakiyev was the President. After his overthrow in 2010, it was said that in 2009 "conditions adopted were knowingly disadvantageous for the state". In 2023, he was sentenced in absentia to 10 years in prison for corruption at Kumtor.
2012. The Kyrgyz Parliament created a temporary commission to check the activities of Kumtor.
2013. The government was instructed to revise the 2009 agreement in favor of Kyrgyzstan. 500 residents of villages in Jeti-Oguz district of Issyk-Kul region blocked the road to the mine, they demanded the termination of the 2009 agreement. By the end of 2013, the Kyrgyzstan government negotiated with Centerra Gold and presented a project to create a 50/50 joint venture. The project was rejected by MPs, who demanded that Kyrgyzstan's share be increased to 67%. Legal proceedings began.
2014. The former Minister of Finance was convicted for bribes of 4 million dollars for the conclusion of the deal on Kumtor. A year later they were released "in connection with the expiration of the term of the charge".
2019. Kyrgyzstan's share fell to 26%.
2020. Kyrgyzstan passed a resolution to impose an interim external manager at Kumtor, Centerra Gold was accused of violating environmental regulations. They were ordered to pay $3 billion in compensation for illegally dumping waste on glaciers.
Centerra Gold filed claims in a court in Canada and an international arbitration tribunal for "seizure of the mine by the Kyrgyz government". The company alleged that Kyrgyzaltyn OJSC attempted to withdraw approximately $29 million from the company's accounts through a forged payment order.
Centerra Gold declared bankruptcy of Kumtor Gold Company's subsidiaries and sought arbitration with the UN Commission on International Trade Law.
2022. Centerra Gold left Kyrgyzstan and agreed to pay $50 million in a lump sum.
Investigations continue.
"It became known that on June 24, 2004, $11 million was transferred by Cameco Corporation and Centerra Company to the account of Kyrgyzaltyn JSC. Four days later, the head of Kyrgyzaltyn, Kamchybek Kudaibergenov, illegally transferred the funds to Aizkraukles Bank in Riga, the capital of Latvia. The money went into the account of Eckerd, a company controlled by Aidar Akayev," Deputy Prime Minister Akylbek Zhaparov said in 2021. "Centerra Gold, after its formation, on June 28 of the same year, without any explanation, gave Central Asia Gold shares worth 3 million 800 thousand dollars to the company. Some time later they were sold for 44.6 million dollars. All this was established during the investigation. The Mushkat law firm also studied the case, and in its conclusion it noted many dubious points and the need to bring Askar Akayev's family to justice. But all this remained the same. This company sold its shares, returned to Kyrgyzstan and acquired licenses for the development of 5 deposits, such as Ak-Zhylga, Turuk, Altyn-Zhylga. Among them, the largest gold field is Taldybulak Levoberezhny. Later this mine was acquired by Kazakh investors. Because they turned out to be close to the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, the authorities stopped investigating them so as not to spoil relations between the states," Radio Azattyk wrote in 2021.
Now it is the world's largest public uranium company.
2002. Cameco created a subsidiary company Kumtor Mountain Holdings Corporation. The company began to handle most of the issues.
2003. Kumtor Mountain Holdings Corporation was renamed Centerra Gold. One of the shareholders is Kyrgyzaltyn Government OJSC.
2004. Restructuring and investment agreement with the Kyrgyzstan government comes into effect. After the restructuring, Kyrgyzaltyn's share decreased to 33% and Cameco's share decreased to 66%. Kyrgyzaltyn transferred part of its shares due to outstanding debts to the International Finance Corporation (part of the World Bank) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Forensic economic examination, which was conducted in 2013, showed that at that time the share of Kyrgyzaltyn in Centerra Gold should have been 58.7%, not 33%, that is, it was understated by 25.7%, in monetary terms - by $171.5 million.
"International lawyers and auditors drew attention to some dubious payments that could be, in their opinion, a way to pay for the "services" of KR officials in concluding agreements on restructuring of the Kumtor project. The investigation and the verdict handed down by the court against the officials confirmed the facts of corruption," they wrote in 2013.
At that time, Askar Akayev was the President of Kyrgyzstan. After his overthrow and subsequent escape from the country, criminal cases were brought against him, including on Kumtor.
2009. Cameco sold its shares to its subsidiary Centerra Gold.
At that time, Kurmanbek Bakiyev was the President. After his overthrow in 2010, it was said that in 2009 "conditions adopted were knowingly disadvantageous for the state". In 2023, he was sentenced in absentia to 10 years in prison for corruption at Kumtor.
2012. The Kyrgyz Parliament created a temporary commission to check the activities of Kumtor.
2013. The government was instructed to revise the 2009 agreement in favor of Kyrgyzstan. 500 residents of villages in Jeti-Oguz district of Issyk-Kul region blocked the road to the mine, they demanded the termination of the 2009 agreement. By the end of 2013, the Kyrgyzstan government negotiated with Centerra Gold and presented a project to create a 50/50 joint venture. The project was rejected by MPs, who demanded that Kyrgyzstan's share be increased to 67%. Legal proceedings began.
2014. The former Minister of Finance was convicted for bribes of 4 million dollars for the conclusion of the deal on Kumtor. A year later they were released "in connection with the expiration of the term of the charge".
2019. Kyrgyzstan's share fell to 26%.
2020. Kyrgyzstan passed a resolution to impose an interim external manager at Kumtor, Centerra Gold was accused of violating environmental regulations. They were ordered to pay $3 billion in compensation for illegally dumping waste on glaciers.
Centerra Gold filed claims in a court in Canada and an international arbitration tribunal for "seizure of the mine by the Kyrgyz government". The company alleged that Kyrgyzaltyn OJSC attempted to withdraw approximately $29 million from the company's accounts through a forged payment order.
Centerra Gold declared bankruptcy of Kumtor Gold Company's subsidiaries and sought arbitration with the UN Commission on International Trade Law.
2022. Centerra Gold left Kyrgyzstan and agreed to pay $50 million in a lump sum.
Investigations continue.
"It became known that on June 24, 2004, $11 million was transferred by Cameco Corporation and Centerra Company to the account of Kyrgyzaltyn JSC. Four days later, the head of Kyrgyzaltyn, Kamchybek Kudaibergenov, illegally transferred the funds to Aizkraukles Bank in Riga, the capital of Latvia. The money went into the account of Eckerd, a company controlled by Aidar Akayev," Deputy Prime Minister Akylbek Zhaparov said in 2021. "Centerra Gold, after its formation, on June 28 of the same year, without any explanation, gave Central Asia Gold shares worth 3 million 800 thousand dollars to the company. Some time later they were sold for 44.6 million dollars. All this was established during the investigation. The Mushkat law firm also studied the case, and in its conclusion it noted many dubious points and the need to bring Askar Akayev's family to justice. But all this remained the same. This company sold its shares, returned to Kyrgyzstan and acquired licenses for the development of 5 deposits, such as Ak-Zhylga, Turuk, Altyn-Zhylga. Among them, the largest gold field is Taldybulak Levoberezhny. Later this mine was acquired by Kazakh investors. Because they turned out to be close to the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, the authorities stopped investigating them so as not to spoil relations between the states," Radio Azattyk wrote in 2021.
Protests in Kyrgyzstan, 2013. Photo by Radio Azattyk
DZHERUY
Dzheruy is the second gold deposit in Kyrgyzstan after Kumtor. Confirmed gold reserves are more than 100 tons. The history of the deposit is a lot of investors coming and going, huge fines, corruption scandals, criminal cases. After each revolution the mining license is taken away or attempted to be taken away from the mining companies.
Dzheruy is the second gold deposit in Kyrgyzstan after Kumtor. Confirmed gold reserves are more than 100 tons. The history of the deposit is a lot of investors coming and going, huge fines, corruption scandals, criminal cases. After each revolution the mining license is taken away or attempted to be taken away from the mining companies.
BACKGROUND
1969. Dzheruy mine was opened in Talas region.
1993. Construction of Talas Gold Ore Plant was stopped due to lack of financing. Without competition, the tender for the development of the mine was given to the American company Morrison Knudsen Gold. Two years later, the company went bankrupt. The established joint venture was taken over by Lavalin. It, in turn, demanded tax benefits, which the Kyrgyz government refused to grant. The joint venture closed.
1996. Oxus from the UK became a new investor. Together with a partner from Australia, they formed a joint company, Norox Mining. Together with Kyrgyzaltyn they formed a joint venture, Talas Gold Mining CJSC. In 1999, the price of gold fell dramatically and the Australians withdrew from the project, Oxus started looking for money.
2005. Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. A representative of Oxus was assassinated - 6 shots were fired.
In 2023, the investigation found that the assassination attempt was carried out on the order of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the President of Kyrgyzstan at that time.
2006. The right to mine was given to Global Gold. In 2007, the shares owned by Global Gold in the joint company were acquired by the Kazakhstani company Visor Holding. Global Gold owned 60% of the shares of Dzheruyaltyn CJSC. Global Gold sold the shares because it "faced constant rallies and blocking of roads, with numerous threats from some MPs to kick the investor out of the country". The company operated for only 4 months during the year.
2010. Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Dzheruyaltyn's license was taken away because the company never started construction work. Kyrgyzstan fell under arbitration fines.
2016. The right to develop was sold to a subsidiary of the Russian Corporation, Russian Platinum. The license was bought for $100 million, the investor also committed to pay the government's fines for Dzheruy - $600 million. The development was undertaken by a subsidiary of Russian Platinum, Alliance Altyn LLC.
Kyrgyzstan has no stake in the company.
2020. Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. The launch of the Talas Gold Ore Plant was postponed. A warehouse at the deposit was looted and a factory building set on fire.
Aibek Buzurmankulov, a former government plenipotentiary representative in Talas region, said that the mine is "billions of dollars that will not go to Kyrgyzstan, but to Russian oligarchs" because "Kyrgyzstan has no share in this project". He added that the agreement was concluded "under Putin's pressure".
Adding to the discontent was the fact that in 2014, Russia's Gazprom bought the assets of Kyrgyzstan's gas operator, Kyrgyzgaz, along with all property, including gas distribution stations, for $1. According to Gazprom's explanation, the company was bought together with an external debt of $65 million, and therefore the amount of the transaction is not $1, but $65 million. According to other data, the external debt was $40 million. Kyrgyzgaz, according to the member of Zhogorku Kenesh, was also sold on the terms of gasification of all of Kyrgyzstan, but the conditions were not met.
2021. The Plant was launched. The opening ceremony was attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kyrgyz President Sadyr Zhaparov.
1993. Construction of Talas Gold Ore Plant was stopped due to lack of financing. Without competition, the tender for the development of the mine was given to the American company Morrison Knudsen Gold. Two years later, the company went bankrupt. The established joint venture was taken over by Lavalin. It, in turn, demanded tax benefits, which the Kyrgyz government refused to grant. The joint venture closed.
1996. Oxus from the UK became a new investor. Together with a partner from Australia, they formed a joint company, Norox Mining. Together with Kyrgyzaltyn they formed a joint venture, Talas Gold Mining CJSC. In 1999, the price of gold fell dramatically and the Australians withdrew from the project, Oxus started looking for money.
2005. Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. A representative of Oxus was assassinated - 6 shots were fired.
In 2023, the investigation found that the assassination attempt was carried out on the order of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the President of Kyrgyzstan at that time.
2006. The right to mine was given to Global Gold. In 2007, the shares owned by Global Gold in the joint company were acquired by the Kazakhstani company Visor Holding. Global Gold owned 60% of the shares of Dzheruyaltyn CJSC. Global Gold sold the shares because it "faced constant rallies and blocking of roads, with numerous threats from some MPs to kick the investor out of the country". The company operated for only 4 months during the year.
2010. Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Dzheruyaltyn's license was taken away because the company never started construction work. Kyrgyzstan fell under arbitration fines.
2016. The right to develop was sold to a subsidiary of the Russian Corporation, Russian Platinum. The license was bought for $100 million, the investor also committed to pay the government's fines for Dzheruy - $600 million. The development was undertaken by a subsidiary of Russian Platinum, Alliance Altyn LLC.
Kyrgyzstan has no stake in the company.
2020. Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. The launch of the Talas Gold Ore Plant was postponed. A warehouse at the deposit was looted and a factory building set on fire.
Aibek Buzurmankulov, a former government plenipotentiary representative in Talas region, said that the mine is "billions of dollars that will not go to Kyrgyzstan, but to Russian oligarchs" because "Kyrgyzstan has no share in this project". He added that the agreement was concluded "under Putin's pressure".
Adding to the discontent was the fact that in 2014, Russia's Gazprom bought the assets of Kyrgyzstan's gas operator, Kyrgyzgaz, along with all property, including gas distribution stations, for $1. According to Gazprom's explanation, the company was bought together with an external debt of $65 million, and therefore the amount of the transaction is not $1, but $65 million. According to other data, the external debt was $40 million. Kyrgyzgaz, according to the member of Zhogorku Kenesh, was also sold on the terms of gasification of all of Kyrgyzstan, but the conditions were not met.
2021. The Plant was launched. The opening ceremony was attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kyrgyz President Sadyr Zhaparov.
Kyrgyzstan's foreign debt in 2021 amounted to 5.1 billion dollars, about 35% of Kyrgyzstan's foreign debt is the portion of the Export-Import Bank of China. Russia's portion is small (here we are talking about the Eurasian Development Bank, where Russia has the most shares), but it uses foreign debt for "humanitarian gifts" - it forgives debts. In 2018, for example, Putin wrote off Kyrgyzstan's entire $240 million debt. Before that, Russia wrote off $188 million and $60 million in debt. The Kyrgyz government called it "an example of strategic friendship". As part of one of the debt write-offs, Russian and Kyrgyz authorities agreed to create a common air defense system.
Like other Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan is a transit territory for gas from Turkmenistan to China. Typically, countries take out a loan to build their part of the pipeline, create a joint company with China that becomes the general contractor, and then charge a fee for gas transit. Kyrgyzstan did the opposite - they leased the land and did not take a loan. This caused indignation. Authorities explained that Kyrgyzstan would receive $75 million annually for leasing the territory for transit, but opponents of the agreement, who insist on repeating the neighbors' actions in terms of joint construction, questioned the calculations.
"In 2018, when we raised a fuss, the authorities said Kyrgyzstan would receive 30 million dollars a year. Then, when the fuss got stronger, they said we would receive 75 million a year. But this amount is not specified in any clause of the agreement. But worst of all, paragraph 7 of the agreement states that if necessary, we will allow the Chinese to expand the pipeline through construction," said former Deputy Prime Minister Bazarbay Mambetov.
Marat Zheenbekov, a spokesman for the State Committee for Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use, replied to Mambetov that the amount depends on the volume of gas being transferred.
"The amount will change every year. In the first year it will be little, in another year more, in general, it will be decided depending on the volume of gas. If you subtract three years for construction, they will pay for 32 years. If you average out the payment, it would be $50-60 million a year".
In any case, authorities say the country has no money to take out a loan.
Like other Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan is a transit territory for gas from Turkmenistan to China. Typically, countries take out a loan to build their part of the pipeline, create a joint company with China that becomes the general contractor, and then charge a fee for gas transit. Kyrgyzstan did the opposite - they leased the land and did not take a loan. This caused indignation. Authorities explained that Kyrgyzstan would receive $75 million annually for leasing the territory for transit, but opponents of the agreement, who insist on repeating the neighbors' actions in terms of joint construction, questioned the calculations.
"In 2018, when we raised a fuss, the authorities said Kyrgyzstan would receive 30 million dollars a year. Then, when the fuss got stronger, they said we would receive 75 million a year. But this amount is not specified in any clause of the agreement. But worst of all, paragraph 7 of the agreement states that if necessary, we will allow the Chinese to expand the pipeline through construction," said former Deputy Prime Minister Bazarbay Mambetov.
Marat Zheenbekov, a spokesman for the State Committee for Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use, replied to Mambetov that the amount depends on the volume of gas being transferred.
"The amount will change every year. In the first year it will be little, in another year more, in general, it will be decided depending on the volume of gas. If you subtract three years for construction, they will pay for 32 years. If you average out the payment, it would be $50-60 million a year".
In any case, authorities say the country has no money to take out a loan.
FIGHT FOR RESOURCES
PIPELINES IN THE REGION
Oil pipelines
Kazakhstan-China
The first pipeline for direct import of Central Asian oil to China.
Belongs to Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP, the founders of which are KazTransOil JSC (50%) and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company Ltd (50%). The pipeline runs from Kazakhstan's Caspian coast to Xinjiang in China.
Construction began in 1997, the first section from Aktobe region to Atyrau was built in 2003. The next pipeline - from Kazakhstan's Atasu to China's Alashankou - was completed in 2005. The last section Kenkiyak-Kumkol was built in 2009. The length of the pipeline is 2228 km, capacity - 14 million tons per year.
Tengiz-Novorossiysk
The pipeline that carries Kazakhstan's main oil exports. Controlled by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). CPC's shareholders are Russia (Transneft - 24% and CPC Company - 7%, LUKARCO B.V. - 12.5%, Rosneft-Shell Caspian Ventures Limited - 7.5%) - 51%; Kazakhstan (KazMunayGas - 19% and Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures LLC - 1.75%) - 20.75%; Chevron Caspian Pipeline Consortium Company - 15%, Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company - 7.5%, BG Overseas Holding Limited - 2%, Eni International N.A. N.V. - 2% and Oryx Caspian Pipeline LLC - 1.75%.
The pipeline receives crude oil from the Tengiz, Karachaganak and Kashagan fields and feedstock from Russian producers.
The oil arrives at the Marine Terminal in Novorossiysk port and is loaded onto tankers that ship the oil to world markets.
The length of the pipeline is 1,511 kilometers.
Kenkiyak – Atyrau
Belongs to the North-West Pipeline Company MunayTas LLP, whose founders are KazTransOil (51%) and CNPC Exploration and Development Company Ltd. (49%), owned by China National Petroleum Corporation.
Kazakhstan-China
The first pipeline for direct import of Central Asian oil to China.
Belongs to Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP, the founders of which are KazTransOil JSC (50%) and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company Ltd (50%). The pipeline runs from Kazakhstan's Caspian coast to Xinjiang in China.
Construction began in 1997, the first section from Aktobe region to Atyrau was built in 2003. The next pipeline - from Kazakhstan's Atasu to China's Alashankou - was completed in 2005. The last section Kenkiyak-Kumkol was built in 2009. The length of the pipeline is 2228 km, capacity - 14 million tons per year.
Tengiz-Novorossiysk
The pipeline that carries Kazakhstan's main oil exports. Controlled by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). CPC's shareholders are Russia (Transneft - 24% and CPC Company - 7%, LUKARCO B.V. - 12.5%, Rosneft-Shell Caspian Ventures Limited - 7.5%) - 51%; Kazakhstan (KazMunayGas - 19% and Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures LLC - 1.75%) - 20.75%; Chevron Caspian Pipeline Consortium Company - 15%, Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company - 7.5%, BG Overseas Holding Limited - 2%, Eni International N.A. N.V. - 2% and Oryx Caspian Pipeline LLC - 1.75%.
The pipeline receives crude oil from the Tengiz, Karachaganak and Kashagan fields and feedstock from Russian producers.
The oil arrives at the Marine Terminal in Novorossiysk port and is loaded onto tankers that ship the oil to world markets.
The length of the pipeline is 1,511 kilometers.
Kenkiyak – Atyrau
Belongs to the North-West Pipeline Company MunayTas LLP, whose founders are KazTransOil (51%) and CNPC Exploration and Development Company Ltd. (49%), owned by China National Petroleum Corporation.
Gas pipelines
Kazakhstan-China. Starts at the borders of Uzbekistan and reaches the Khorgos border post.
The gas pipeline consists of three lines. The first section transmits 40 billion m3 of gas from Turkmenistan per year. The second section - Beineu - Bozoy - Shymkent gas pipeline - connects the West with the South, it transmits 10 billion m3 of gas from Kazakhstan per year. Gas is exported to China through this section, and in the future the pipeline will help to gasify the southern regions of Kazakhstan.
The pipeline is owned by KazTransGas JSC and Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline Company Limited (50% each).
Central Asia - China. Goes through the territory of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and China. It mainly connects Turkmenistan and China. Design capacity is 40 billion m3 per year.
The agreement on construction and gas supplies was signed in 2007, it was decided that Turkmenistan would join the Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline project.
The pipeline was built by China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau, China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation and Swiss company Zeromax, which started its work in Uzbekistan. Some sections were built by Gazprom.
Central Asia - Center. Controlled by Gazprom. Starts in Turkmenistan and runs through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia. In 2021, Turkmenistan supplied about 10 billion cubic meters through this pipeline and Kazakhstan supplied about 4.6 billion cubic meters to Russia.
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Planned gas pipeline. Should link Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan; construction of an additional line from Kazakhstan's Tengiz is under discussion.
Kazakhstan-China. Starts at the borders of Uzbekistan and reaches the Khorgos border post.
The gas pipeline consists of three lines. The first section transmits 40 billion m3 of gas from Turkmenistan per year. The second section - Beineu - Bozoy - Shymkent gas pipeline - connects the West with the South, it transmits 10 billion m3 of gas from Kazakhstan per year. Gas is exported to China through this section, and in the future the pipeline will help to gasify the southern regions of Kazakhstan.
The pipeline is owned by KazTransGas JSC and Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline Company Limited (50% each).
Central Asia - China. Goes through the territory of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and China. It mainly connects Turkmenistan and China. Design capacity is 40 billion m3 per year.
The agreement on construction and gas supplies was signed in 2007, it was decided that Turkmenistan would join the Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline project.
The pipeline was built by China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau, China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation and Swiss company Zeromax, which started its work in Uzbekistan. Some sections were built by Gazprom.
Central Asia - Center. Controlled by Gazprom. Starts in Turkmenistan and runs through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia. In 2021, Turkmenistan supplied about 10 billion cubic meters through this pipeline and Kazakhstan supplied about 4.6 billion cubic meters to Russia.
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Planned gas pipeline. Should link Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan; construction of an additional line from Kazakhstan's Tengiz is under discussion.
The material was prepared by the team consisting of Khadisha Akayeva (CABAR.asia School of Analytical Journalism alumna), Bolot Satarkulov, Ilya Barokhovskiy, Adil Turdukulov, Galym Ageleuov.