CENTRAL ASIA AND NEIGHBORS. MIGRATION 2022.
RELOCATING MIGRANTS AND RUSSIAN PENSIONERS.
In 2022, the Russian Federation issued documents to a record number of new citizens from Central Asia. A sharp increase was provided by 173 000 residents of Tajikistan who received Russian citizenship.
The scale of this phenomenon turned out to be such that individual Russian authors began to write about "the great transmigration of peoples," and social networks flooded with disturbing publications about the issues of labor migration, ghettos and ethnic crime in Russia.
The suddenness of this reaction could be compared with the commotion of people drinking tea peacefully, who at some point realized that all this time a large bright (but for some reason completely invisible to them) ELEPHANT was sitting at the table next to them.
Meanwhile, having studied the statistics for the last decade, we immediately understand that there is nothing unexpected in the current situation. The war was indeed the trigger for the changes that had taken place.
But even without it, "the great transmigration of people" (as a process caused by the conscious policy of the government of the Russian Federation) would have taken place ... albeit many times slower, during not individual years but entire decades.
What are the consequences of migration processes in the expanses of Central Asia in 2022? What is the future of the region?
But even without it, "the great transmigration of people" (as a process caused by the conscious policy of the government of the Russian Federation) would have taken place ... albeit many times slower, during not individual years but entire decades.
What are the consequences of migration processes in the expanses of Central Asia in 2022? What is the future of the region?
THE "THREADS" PROJECT is an analytical project that tells how the processes in one of the countries of Central Asia affect the rest of the countries in the region. An important part of the project is the understanding of how these processes affect ordinary citizens' lives.
THE THEME OF THE ISSUE
LABOR MIGRATION. 2022.
The events of 2022 have reshuffled the entire deck that has developed in our region. For the first time in the last 37* years, Russia in a mutual migration exchange turned out to be not only a host but also a source of multimillion flows of migrants. The main role here was played by migration, which some researchers called anti-war. Migration of high-quality specialists and freelancers from the Russian Federation.
*Since 1985, when the RSFSR ceased to be a source of a large number of specialists for the union republics.
*Since 1985, when the RSFSR ceased to be a source of a large number of specialists for the union republics.
CENTRAL ASIA AND ANTI-WAR LABOR
"WITH TEARS AND PAIN, I ADMITTED THAT THE CHANCES ARE LITTLE EVER TO RETURN..."
34-years-old Ilya Kuznetsov left the Russian city of Irkutsk 12 days after Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. An entrepreneur, IT specialist, designer, activist says that he could not continue to live in an aggressor country in which a military censorship machine was deployed.
- ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant- Nothing was known about mobilization yet, just the very fact of the outbreak of the war greatly cut the ground from under the feet, it was completely not clear what to do, it was not believed that the war could begin. Literally on the second or third day, a quite tough military censorship machine began to deploy. I tried to speak publicly wherever I could, I tried to participate in political activities, I helped the anti-corruption foundation [a non-profit foundation created by Russian political prisoner Alexei Navalny] and it seemed that it was impossible to stay and continue doing what I was doing, because it was simply not safe.
It took 12 days to sell and distribute the property, to distribute powers of attorney to relatives and colleagues with whom Ilya has a joint business.
The most difficult thing was buying an air ticket. After numerous attempts, the idea came to leave Russia by car through Mongolia or to leave with Kyrgyz migrants by minibus.
- ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant- It travels about 20 hours; I was already ready for it. But they did not take me – back then, after COVID, the land borders with Kazakhstan were closed, and it was possible to transit only with a Kyrgyz passport, but it was impossible with a Russian one," says Ilya. - In the first days of the war, flights began to be canceled one after another. I bought tickets from Irkutsk direct to where they were - they were canceled, I bought new ones - they were canceled again. At some point, I already thought that, probably, I would not be able to fly away, I was ready to buy some old Niva and go by land to Mongolia, because I thought that was all. But in the end, one flight Irkutsk - Osh appeared, it was not canceled, and I flew to Osh on it.
On March 7, together with his wife, he flew to Osh in Kyrgyzstan - a country that he had not previously been to, to a city that he had not heard of before. Impressions of the city faded against the background of the joy of freedom.
- ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant- When we arrived, there was a feeling of freedom, there was a feeling that you could exhale in safety in a place where you could live and talk.
The couple stayed in Osh for three days, and then flew to Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan Ilya did not meet any language or bureaucratic barriers. Initial plans for a further move to Turkey soon changed. Already in April, he wrote in his blog that "Kyrgyzstan is perhaps the most comfortable country for relocation [note – migration]".
- ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant- At first, I got a little stuck, I thought that it was good, cozy, cool here, it is possible to stay here not for two weeks but for a month or two. In two months, acquaintances, some projects, business began to be made, and we have been here for more than a year, - says Ilya Kuznetsov. – We advertised Bishkek very strongly when we arrived, and this advertisement worked. We even have our own telegram chat – "Irkutsk people in Bishkek", there are about thirty people there. These are exactly those to whom we strongly advertised Bishkek, - says Ilya. - And as soon as we arrived, we made a chat "Welcome to Kyrgyzstan", there are about 20 thousand people now.
Ilya is a representative of the first wave of migrants from Russia who left after the start of the war. Representatives of the second - much more numerous - wave of migrants left Russia after the announcement of mobilization. Then, in a number of Central Asian countries, housing prices jumped sharply (for example, in Kazakhstan).
- ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant- In the beginning, there were no problems with housing - we rented an apartment at a fairly good price, at that time the prices had not risen yet. Now there are much more difficulties with housing, prices have risen a lot. Like one and a half times.
Some of the locals were dissatisfied with the current situation, some helped. Some have been able to combine it.
- ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant- When the mobilization began, there were a lot of difficulties, people did not have enough housing. Friends who had some establishments let people to spend the night at their place. We had a two-room apartment with a bedroom, a kitchen and an office, and we also placed five people on the sofa and on the floor in the office, they lived with us for some time while they were looking for housing. At that time, it was difficult, then some people lived in incomprehensible conditions somewhere in the basements of houses and somewhere else, they rented small apartments together with a large number of people. It was everywhere, but it did not last long - probably a month. Then it went downhill, I do not hear such stories anymore, although it is still popular to rent a big house or a big apartment and live in families or alone. Local people helped a lot, and indignation - even those who helped were indignant, but this is completely understandable. But there was a lot of help.
In a year, Ilya got used to Kyrgyzstan - he admits that he hopes that he cannot be distinguished from the locals.
- ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant- The first wave - those who have already lived here for a year, there is a feeling that they are already local, participating in some activities - I hope that I can no longer be distinguished from the local "Orus". I try to learn basic phrases in Kyrgyz.
Now the man teaches at a local art college, earns additionally on a freelance basis, and is engaged in art activism along with Kyrgyz specialists. Not all Russians did this.
- ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant"Most of them stayed, but I know that they all have problems with work, earnings; they live in acceptable but not very good conditions for their savings, and they have not been able to earn some kind of income for more than a year," says Kuznetsov. - Now I already seem to get more money than from freelancing, and I saw that there are more or less active people who get some kind of a part-time job. For example, I teach at Compass College and almost a third of the teaching staff are just arrived specialists. Now many Russians work in the field of hospitality, in bars, as couriers. In general, there is work, but, of course, not always highly paid.
Ilya does not know how long he will stay in Kyrgyzstan - plans for the future are still vague. One thing is clear - the chances of returning to Russia are small.
- ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant"Six months later, with tears and pain, I seemed to admit to myself that there was little chance of ever returning," says Ilya. – I am going to stay here for the next 2-3 years. What happens next is not entirely clear. I thought to stay here completely, now I have doubts because of the decrease in stability, the possibility of drastic changes. I really did not like to suddenly leave Russia; I really do not want to tie myself to a country where these risks also exist.
HOW DID MIGRATION 2022 AFFECT COUNTRIES IN THE REGION?
As we have already considered in our previous review - Russia is the largest source of migrants' remittances for most countries of Central Asia*. The events of 2022 have not changed this situation. So, for example, if in 2021 the portion of Russian transfers
for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was about 70% (of the total volume of transfers), then in 2022 this portion increased by 7% and 11%, respectively.
Experts note that the volume of transfers to countries clearly correlates with GDP of Russia. That is, the fall in GDP, the economic crisis will largely affect the countries of our region.
However, this assessment is not something new. Something else is much more important.
In 2022, in addition to the traditional processes associated with the migration exchange between Russia and Central Asia, the region, in an unusually acute form, faced processes that either had not previously existed or had existed in a much milder form:
- mass emigration** (which some publicists aptly called "anti-war");
– a multimillion influx of refugees*** from the war-torn territories of Ukraine;
The countries of Central Asia, in turn, had to cope with the influx of millions of highly skilled migrants from Russia.
Being interconnected, these processes have significantly affected all **** actors in the region and are now leading to completely unexpected (from the point of view of ordinary citizens) consequences.
*Excluding Turkmenistan.
**Influenced both Russia and Central Asia equally from all perspectives.
** Influenced Russia in the short term, but in the long term it entails significant consequences for the Central Asian region as well, as it affects the labor markets of the Russian Federation.
****Excluding Turkmenistan. ;)
for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was about 70% (of the total volume of transfers), then in 2022 this portion increased by 7% and 11%, respectively.
Experts note that the volume of transfers to countries clearly correlates with GDP of Russia. That is, the fall in GDP, the economic crisis will largely affect the countries of our region.
However, this assessment is not something new. Something else is much more important.
In 2022, in addition to the traditional processes associated with the migration exchange between Russia and Central Asia, the region, in an unusually acute form, faced processes that either had not previously existed or had existed in a much milder form:
- mass emigration** (which some publicists aptly called "anti-war");
– a multimillion influx of refugees*** from the war-torn territories of Ukraine;
The countries of Central Asia, in turn, had to cope with the influx of millions of highly skilled migrants from Russia.
Being interconnected, these processes have significantly affected all **** actors in the region and are now leading to completely unexpected (from the point of view of ordinary citizens) consequences.
*Excluding Turkmenistan.
**Influenced both Russia and Central Asia equally from all perspectives.
** Influenced Russia in the short term, but in the long term it entails significant consequences for the Central Asian region as well, as it affects the labor markets of the Russian Federation.
****Excluding Turkmenistan. ;)
MIGRATION. 2022.
HOW DID MIGRATION 2022 AFFECT DIFFERENT COUNTRIES IN THE REGION? KAZAKHSTAN.
To date, there are no accurate estimates of how many Russians left the Russian Federation and entered Kazakhstan in order to stay in it after the start of the war. We can only operate with indirect data. According to the estimation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, only in the first 9 months of 2022, 1,66 million Russians entered the country (1,64 million left).
About 8,000 non-residents received an individual identification number (IIN), which allows them to conduct a business and business transactions in 2022.
The migration of Russians to Kazakhstan and their subsequent movement to other countries spurred many sectors of the economy of the Republic*.
Many Russian IT companies have completely or partially transferred their business to Kazakhstan**.
At the moment, we can control the changes only by indirect signs (for example, during 2022, Astana Hub, the largest international technopark of IT startups in Central Asia, grew sharply and unexpectedly).
*The issue of creating joint companies with the participation of Russians and changing the face of trade in the region is indirectly related to migration, but still relates primarily to international trade and will be considered by us in a separate article.
**Partly this may be due to an attempt to avoid sanctions.
About 8,000 non-residents received an individual identification number (IIN), which allows them to conduct a business and business transactions in 2022.
The migration of Russians to Kazakhstan and their subsequent movement to other countries spurred many sectors of the economy of the Republic*.
Many Russian IT companies have completely or partially transferred their business to Kazakhstan**.
At the moment, we can control the changes only by indirect signs (for example, during 2022, Astana Hub, the largest international technopark of IT startups in Central Asia, grew sharply and unexpectedly).
*The issue of creating joint companies with the participation of Russians and changing the face of trade in the region is indirectly related to migration, but still relates primarily to international trade and will be considered by us in a separate article.
**Partly this may be due to an attempt to avoid sanctions.
Housing prices have risen sharply.
But despite the significant influx of migrants from Russia, the economy of Kazakhstan has not shown significant changes (unlike, for example, the economies of Armenia and Georgia).
"..this is an economy of a different structure. Georgia and Armenia are very small economies, more of a service type. These economies starved for tourists during the pandemic. Before the pandemic, both economies greatly increased their tourism capacity and remained heavily underutilized during the pandemic. Therefore, there was where to accommodate, rather than to feed the entire influx [of Russians], who came to these countries. That is, the underutilized hospitality sector received such a powerful incentive. There is no such sector in Kazakhstan. Yes, they develop the tourism sector, but not on such a scale as neighboring countries. And there was no driver before the pandemic."
Sofia Donets
Chief Economist for Russia and the CIS+ "Renaissance Capital" IC
INTERIM CONCLUSION
The economy of Kazakhstan is relatively large, so the injection of migrants from Russia has not led to significant changes. In the long term, we will certainly see changes in the dynamics in the export of services and IT.
MIGRATION. 2022.
HOW DID 2022 MIGRATION AFFECT DIFFERENT COUNTRIES IN THE REGION? UZBEKISTAN.
There are no official statistics on the number of people who arrived in Uzbekistan (and stayed in it) today. The well-known economist and independent financial analyst Abdulla Abdukadirov estimates the number of people who entered Uzbekistan in the first weeks at 100 000 people.
"Purely by feeling, about 100 thousand people entered Uzbekistan, about half of them left for other countries after 2-3 weeks. The majority of those who arrived are the same as those who left the country several years ago or their close relatives. "There are very few "outsiders"".
The reaction is different. Some are very happy with the newly opened possibilities of freedom (you can open your favorite websites, social networks without VPN, you can use and pay with cards); others enjoy the weather, an abundance of fruits and vegetables; others compare prices and other amenities for living with major Russian cities and generally come to the conclusion that it is not all bad. Of course, Uzbekistan cannot provide the same level of comfort as many cities in Russia, in terms of Internet speed, accessibility of public transport and other things yet. In general, our cities are not focused on the needs of residents, and this is a big problem. But we will be glad to look at all this "disgrace" through their eyes, since much of it is already familiar to us, and we do not even notice. But thanks to their observations, many simple things can be fixed without spending much time and resources"
The reaction is different. Some are very happy with the newly opened possibilities of freedom (you can open your favorite websites, social networks without VPN, you can use and pay with cards); others enjoy the weather, an abundance of fruits and vegetables; others compare prices and other amenities for living with major Russian cities and generally come to the conclusion that it is not all bad. Of course, Uzbekistan cannot provide the same level of comfort as many cities in Russia, in terms of Internet speed, accessibility of public transport and other things yet. In general, our cities are not focused on the needs of residents, and this is a big problem. But we will be glad to look at all this "disgrace" through their eyes, since much of it is already familiar to us, and we do not even notice. But thanks to their observations, many simple things can be fixed without spending much time and resources"
Abdulla Abdukadirov
First Deputy Director General of the Agency for Strategic Reforms
It can be stated that today Uzbekistan is in a difficult situation. The geopolitical circumstances of 2022 have led to the change in the investment climate throughout the region.
On the other hand, the current situation has opened up a number of new opportunities for entire industries. The wave of highly skilled migrants has created points of growth, which Uzbekistan has not failed to take advantage of this, moreover, consciously and strategically thoughtfully.
Among the practical measures that directly have influenced the influx of highly qualified specialists, one can list the complete exemption for migrants from all corporate taxes, the reduction of personal income tax from 12% to 7.5%, and the simplification of procedures for registering a business and hiring foreign experts.
Government policy has led to a tangible growth in the IT sector of Uzbekistan. The export of services from Uzbekistan in 2022 not only recovered (compared to the period before the pandemic) but also showed a significant increase.
On the other hand, the current situation has opened up a number of new opportunities for entire industries. The wave of highly skilled migrants has created points of growth, which Uzbekistan has not failed to take advantage of this, moreover, consciously and strategically thoughtfully.
Among the practical measures that directly have influenced the influx of highly qualified specialists, one can list the complete exemption for migrants from all corporate taxes, the reduction of personal income tax from 12% to 7.5%, and the simplification of procedures for registering a business and hiring foreign experts.
Government policy has led to a tangible growth in the IT sector of Uzbekistan. The export of services from Uzbekistan in 2022 not only recovered (compared to the period before the pandemic) but also showed a significant increase.
Of course, we can assume that this unique increase in the profitability of the service sector is the result not only of mass anti-war migration but also of a conscious policy of the government and the involved business structures of Uzbekistan. However, it is worth considering that the selection of the most qualified migrants and the provision of working conditions for them is one of the directions of this policy.
"The relocation program was formed based on the circumstances. We did not plan to accept such a flow of foreign citizens, but we received a huge number of applications from companies, we saw that many experts from IT strived to get to us. And so the Tashkent Rush Relocation Program happened (migrants were purposefully helped with adaptation in the country, adaptation of their families, job search, search of a kindergarten or a school, selection of housing. In some cases, according to Spot, the technopark even organized charter flights to transfer entire teams, i.e. the business structures of Uzbekistan organized the export of IT projects they were interested in Tashkent).
We acted reactively and fully relied on the requests of the relocating migrants themselves."
We acted reactively and fully relied on the requests of the relocating migrants themselves."
Bakhodir Ayupov
CEO of ITPU University, Ex-Deputy Director of IT Park for International Relations.
Due to the prompt assistance of the country's leadership, the Ministry for the Development of Information Technologies and Communications, Uzbekistan managed to attract a significant number of highly qualified specialists.
As part of the relocation process, in 2022, 68 foreign IT companies became residents of Uzbekistan.
As part of the relocation process, in 2022, 68 foreign IT companies became residents of Uzbekistan.
INTERIM CONCLUSION
In the case of Uzbekistan, we can state that the influx of anti-war migrants from Russia has led to a sharp increase in the export of services (which includes the IT sector). The amount of growth is abnormally large for one year. Over the previous 7 years, the annual growth (in absolute terms) has never even reached half of the value that was shown in 2022.
In the long term, the migration of specialists from the Russian Federation may become one of the main drivers of national economic growth*.
* It is worth considering that the events of 2023, in particular the preparation of conditions for a large mobilization, significantly increase the motivation for anti-war migrants. It is possible that in the near future we will see new waves of migration to the countries of Central Asia.
In the long term, the migration of specialists from the Russian Federation may become one of the main drivers of national economic growth*.
* It is worth considering that the events of 2023, in particular the preparation of conditions for a large mobilization, significantly increase the motivation for anti-war migrants. It is possible that in the near future we will see new waves of migration to the countries of Central Asia.
MIGRATION. 2022.
HOW DID 2022 MIGRATION AFFECT DIFFERENT COUNTRIES IN THE REGION? KYRGYZSTAN.
In August 2022, the Cabinet of Ministers of the country adopted a regulation "On the pilot project "On the status of "Digital nomad" and the procedure for assigning it to foreign citizens", according to which IT specialists from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia can come to the country and work without registration and permission.
The status of "Digital nomad" provides for:
- exemption from the obligation to register at the place of residence in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic;
- exemption from the need to obtain a work permit;
- automatic receipt of a personal identification number (PIN);
- work permit up to 12 months with the possibility of extension up to one year;
- the right to carry out individual entrepreneurial activities or activities as a legal entity;
- the right to initiate the registration of a legal entity;
- the right to open and use bank accounts in the Kyrgyz Republic without mandatory registration at the place of residence.
From September 29, 2022 to February 2023, 2799 applications were submitted for Digital Nomad status. 1490 of these applications were approved. According to the interview with Ilya Kuznetsov, the total number of migrants from Russia is dozens of times higher than these figures. Obviously, not all migrants from the Russian Federation can or want to claim the status of "Digital Nomads".
Kyrgyz experts also note that migrants have affected entire industries. Hotel owners and property owners benefited from the arrival of foreigners: rental prices in Bishkek, Osh and other cities immediately rose sharply. The banking sector also acts as a beneficiary: commissions for banking services for foreign citizens were raised here.
The status of "Digital nomad" provides for:
- exemption from the obligation to register at the place of residence in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic;
- exemption from the need to obtain a work permit;
- automatic receipt of a personal identification number (PIN);
- work permit up to 12 months with the possibility of extension up to one year;
- the right to carry out individual entrepreneurial activities or activities as a legal entity;
- the right to initiate the registration of a legal entity;
- the right to open and use bank accounts in the Kyrgyz Republic without mandatory registration at the place of residence.
From September 29, 2022 to February 2023, 2799 applications were submitted for Digital Nomad status. 1490 of these applications were approved. According to the interview with Ilya Kuznetsov, the total number of migrants from Russia is dozens of times higher than these figures. Obviously, not all migrants from the Russian Federation can or want to claim the status of "Digital Nomads".
Kyrgyz experts also note that migrants have affected entire industries. Hotel owners and property owners benefited from the arrival of foreigners: rental prices in Bishkek, Osh and other cities immediately rose sharply. The banking sector also acts as a beneficiary: commissions for banking services for foreign citizens were raised here.
INTERIM CONCLUSION
According to indirect data, Kyrgyzstan at the initial stage received a large number of migrants from the Russian Federation (who used Bishkek as a transit territory). However, in the future, the behavior of migrants began to be influenced by various, multidirectional factors such as:
- Bishkek is a rather comfortable space for Russian-speaking specialists.
- The government of Kyrgyzstan made a conscious effort to retain the most skilled migrants in the Kyrgyz economy.
- The total volume of the economy of Kyrgyzstan is not very large (compared to neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) and does not provide enough investment for the implementation of large projects.
Today, the statistical authorities of Kyrgyzstan do not provide accurate information to assess the consequences for the economy of the Republic. We will make a more accurate assessment at the end of 2023.
- Bishkek is a rather comfortable space for Russian-speaking specialists.
- The government of Kyrgyzstan made a conscious effort to retain the most skilled migrants in the Kyrgyz economy.
- The total volume of the economy of Kyrgyzstan is not very large (compared to neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) and does not provide enough investment for the implementation of large projects.
Today, the statistical authorities of Kyrgyzstan do not provide accurate information to assess the consequences for the economy of the Republic. We will make a more accurate assessment at the end of 2023.
MIGRATION. 2022.
HOW DID 2022 MIGRATION AFFECT DIFFERENT COUNTRIES IN THE REGION? RUSSIA.
In 2022, between 500 000 and 1 000 000 anti-war migrants irretrievably left the Russian Federation (even according to Russian estimates*). At the same time, in 2022, the Russian Federation issued documents to a record number of new citizens from Central Asia. A sharp increase was provided by 173 000 residents of Tajikistan who received Russian citizenship.
Are these two statistics related? Such an increase in the number of citizenships of the country at war, which is cut off from the system of the world economy and has been (in the long term) in a protracted financial crisis for decades, looks unusual.
And it should be explained by some imperceptible at first glance but important factors.
And it should be explained by some imperceptible at first glance but important factors.
Let us try to find them.
We could consider the unique decisions of the Russian government that are tied to the conduct of hostilities against neighboring Ukraine as the first significant factor influencing the adoption of Russian citizenship.
For example, the simplification of the acquisition of citizenship for those foreign citizens who enter into contracts for military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or military formations for a period of one year.
However, this factor (quite interesting in itself) still could not change the overall picture so significantly with an increase in the number of those who took Russian citizenship, because this decision came into force only in the last quarter of 2022.
For example, the simplification of the acquisition of citizenship for those foreign citizens who enter into contracts for military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or military formations for a period of one year.
However, this factor (quite interesting in itself) still could not change the overall picture so significantly with an increase in the number of those who took Russian citizenship, because this decision came into force only in the last quarter of 2022.
Labor migration could be considered as the second significant factor.
In our previous reviews , we have already pointed out that the Russian Federation forms one of the largest migration corridors in the world. Every year the number of entries from Central Asia to the Russian Federation grows.
In our previous reviews , we have already pointed out that the Russian Federation forms one of the largest migration corridors in the world. Every year the number of entries from Central Asia to the Russian Federation grows.
This process is connected both with the evolution of the EAEU legislation and with separate agreements concluded by the Russian Federation with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
However, the statistics of temporary labor migration and the statistics of citizenship acquisition do not always directly correlate with each other. Depending on the economic and political situation, the governments of countries receiving migrants can both consciously put up barriers in order to deter temporary labor migrants from acquiring citizenship, and vice versa – to facilitate its admission.
However, the statistics of temporary labor migration and the statistics of citizenship acquisition do not always directly correlate with each other. Depending on the economic and political situation, the governments of countries receiving migrants can both consciously put up barriers in order to deter temporary labor migrants from acquiring citizenship, and vice versa – to facilitate its admission.
The actions of the Russian government over the past two years demonstrate that it has been deliberately reducing the number of barriers to the acquisition of Russian citizenship.
"Russia has expanded the list of professions and specialties of foreigners who are eligible to obtain the country's citizenship in a simplified manner.
The corresponding document has been approved by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Russian Federation.
The list of professions includes builders, medical workers, farmers, teachers, journalists, engineers and many others. In total, the list includes 203 specialties in 14 sections."
10:22 15.06.2023
The corresponding document has been approved by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Russian Federation.
The list of professions includes builders, medical workers, farmers, teachers, journalists, engineers and many others. In total, the list includes 203 specialties in 14 sections."
10:22 15.06.2023
Sputnik Tajikistan
The conscious efforts of the Russian authorities to increase the flow of labor migrants from Central Asia to the Russian Federation were started BEFORE the invasion of Ukraine. However, in 2022 and 2023, the Russian government accelerated work to simplify the acquisition of Russian citizenship for those migrants who are highly qualified.
We can assume that one of the motives for facilitating the acquisition of Russian citizenship in 2022-2023 was the loss of a large number of citizens who went abroad in connection with the rejection of hostilities.
By increasing the flow of labor migrants, the government of the Russian Federation at the same time creates more and more favorable conditions for the largest possible proportion of these migrants to become citizens of the Russian Federation.
We can assume that one of the motives for facilitating the acquisition of Russian citizenship in 2022-2023 was the loss of a large number of citizens who went abroad in connection with the rejection of hostilities.
By increasing the flow of labor migrants, the government of the Russian Federation at the same time creates more and more favorable conditions for the largest possible proportion of these migrants to become citizens of the Russian Federation.
First of all, it has to do with demographics.
In 2023, demographers of the National Research University HSE (Higher School of Economics) calculated
the number of migrants needed by Russia. To keep the population at the same level, the Russian Federation needs to attract from 390 000 to 1,1 million* migrants a year.
The corresponding study has been prepared by scientists from the Institute of Demography named after A.G. Vishnevsky of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Valery Yumaguzin and Maria Vinnik.
According to demographers, depending on various scenarios of fertility and mortality, the level of migration growth in 2021–2023 should have been (to stabilize the population at the previous level) from 460 000 to 1 200 000 people.
* Depending on the number of births, where both optimistic and pessimistic forecasts are given.
the number of migrants needed by Russia. To keep the population at the same level, the Russian Federation needs to attract from 390 000 to 1,1 million* migrants a year.
The corresponding study has been prepared by scientists from the Institute of Demography named after A.G. Vishnevsky of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Valery Yumaguzin and Maria Vinnik.
According to demographers, depending on various scenarios of fertility and mortality, the level of migration growth in 2021–2023 should have been (to stabilize the population at the previous level) from 460 000 to 1 200 000 people.
* Depending on the number of births, where both optimistic and pessimistic forecasts are given.
At first glance, it may seem that the task of stabilizing the population at the same level is not paramount for the government of a belligerent state. Population decline is primarily related to citizens of retirement age, i.е. those citizens who no longer take part in production processes but rather create an additional burden on the budget. It may seem that the task of stabilizing the population at the same level can simply be neglected for several years - in order to solve it sometime later.
However, this task is directly related to the most important problem that the government of the Russian Federation needs to solve right now - a decrease in the number of payers of contributions to the Pension Fund.
MIGRATION. 2022.
MIGRANTS FROM CENTRAL ASIA AND RUSSIAN PENSIONERS? HOW ARE THEY RELATED?
Until 2014, the pension system of the Russian Federation belonged to mixed pension systems. It combined elements of the solidary* and accumulative** pension systems.
From 2002 to 2014, employers' mandatory pension contributions had been divided into parts. Since 2010, 16% of each employee's salary had gone to the budget of the Pension Fund of Russia (PFR), and then had gone to payments to current pensioners. 6% had been transferred to a person's individual retirement account.
By 2014, the gap between employers' contributions and pension payments was too wide. There were more and more pensioners, and the number of working citizens had been slowly but constantly increasing.
The Government of the Russian Federation had officially decided to transfer all pension contributions to the PFR for payments to pensioners. It can be said that from that moment the pension system of the Russian Federation returned to the system of solidarity payments, when the younger generation pays a pension (with its contributions) to the older one.
* The payment of pensions to the elderly is carried out at the expense of contributions from the current working people.
**The payment of pensions is carried out at the expense of funds accumulated by a pensioner during his/her life and investment income, interest accrued in the course of investing this capital.
From 2002 to 2014, employers' mandatory pension contributions had been divided into parts. Since 2010, 16% of each employee's salary had gone to the budget of the Pension Fund of Russia (PFR), and then had gone to payments to current pensioners. 6% had been transferred to a person's individual retirement account.
By 2014, the gap between employers' contributions and pension payments was too wide. There were more and more pensioners, and the number of working citizens had been slowly but constantly increasing.
The Government of the Russian Federation had officially decided to transfer all pension contributions to the PFR for payments to pensioners. It can be said that from that moment the pension system of the Russian Federation returned to the system of solidarity payments, when the younger generation pays a pension (with its contributions) to the older one.
* The payment of pensions to the elderly is carried out at the expense of contributions from the current working people.
**The payment of pensions is carried out at the expense of funds accumulated by a pensioner during his/her life and investment income, interest accrued in the course of investing this capital.
In the context of the demographic crisis in the Russian Federation, in theory, a situation should already have arisen when an ever-decreasing number of workers pay pensions to an ever-increasing number of pensioners. That is, at some point, the pension contributions of all workers should no longer be enough for all pensioners.
However, looking at the statistics, we do not yet observe such a picture. The number of pensioners registered in the system of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (reorganized from January 1, 2023) had been steadily growing until 2019 (increasing from 34,0 million people at the end of 1991 to 43,9 million people at the beginning 2019).
However, from 2019 to 2022, the number of pensioners registered in the system of the Pension Fund of Russia had been declining (by 0,7% in 2019, 1,3% in 2020, 2,3% in 2021, 0,6% for 2022).
However, from 2019 to 2022, the number of pensioners registered in the system of the Pension Fund of Russia had been declining (by 0,7% in 2019, 1,3% in 2020, 2,3% in 2021, 0,6% for 2022).
We can say that the Russian government, under the influence of internal economic factors, has adopted a policy of deliberately reducing the recipients of payments from the pension fund.
The number of pensioners had not increased in 4 years (which would be expected in the context of an aging population), but had reduced by 2,12 million people. We find the reason for this quite quickly - the pension reform.
An increase in the retirement age leads to the fact that some of the relatively young people of pre-retirement age retire much later, while older age cohorts (those who have retired a long time ago) rapidly decline due to natural mortality.
Starting from 2019, the Russian government gradually increased the retirement age in order to reduce the number of pension recipients, i.e. to reduce the burden on the pension system of Russia. According to the results of the first year of the reform - 2019 - according to Rosstat, the number of pensioners was reduced by 319 000 people, in 2020 - by 569 000*. In 2021, the process accelerated: in the first quarter, the country lost 379 000 pensioners, in the second – 243 000, in the third – 145 000, in the fourth – 204 000. In total, the country lost 971 000 pensioners in 2021.
*The COVID epidemic has also played a role.
An increase in the retirement age leads to the fact that some of the relatively young people of pre-retirement age retire much later, while older age cohorts (those who have retired a long time ago) rapidly decline due to natural mortality.
Starting from 2019, the Russian government gradually increased the retirement age in order to reduce the number of pension recipients, i.e. to reduce the burden on the pension system of Russia. According to the results of the first year of the reform - 2019 - according to Rosstat, the number of pensioners was reduced by 319 000 people, in 2020 - by 569 000*. In 2021, the process accelerated: in the first quarter, the country lost 379 000 pensioners, in the second – 243 000, in the third – 145 000, in the fourth – 204 000. In total, the country lost 971 000 pensioners in 2021.
*The COVID epidemic has also played a role.
INTERIM CONCLUSION
Due to the policy of reducing the number of pensioners, the ratio of people employed in the economy per a pensioner thus remains relatively stable for the time being. That is, a relatively stable number of employees pay pension contributions to a relatively stable number of pensioners.
However, this approach has its limitations. It is impossible to raise the retirement age indefinitely (the resources of this approach are almost exhausted).
The sharp increase in the acceptance of new citizenships of the Russian Federation by the inhabitants of Central Asia is the result of a conscious policy of the Russian government.
At the same time, despite the rather thoughtful interaction with the governments of the Central Asian countries, the government of the Russian Federation extremely illogically shot itself in the foot, causing multimillion waves of anti-war migration.
Undoubtedly, the population decline creates other challenges for the Russian government (a decrease in the number of taxpayers, a decrease in the mobilization resource, etc.). However, it is precisely that problem with pension contributions is the problem of today, i.e. the problem that cannot simply be left to the future, the problem that will be noticed by large groups of the population (pensioners and people of pre-retirement age), and it will lead to a sharp explosion of social discontent.
Obviously, in order to solve this problem, the Russian government will have to continue to create new conditions every year to attract new citizens from Central Asia or other regions.
The only alternative to the rapid collapse of the pension system of the Russian Federation in this case is the constant "import" of new citizens who pay pension contributions to previous generations of Russians. The policy of importing "ordinary" labor migrants no longer works in this case.
However, this approach has its limitations. It is impossible to raise the retirement age indefinitely (the resources of this approach are almost exhausted).
The sharp increase in the acceptance of new citizenships of the Russian Federation by the inhabitants of Central Asia is the result of a conscious policy of the Russian government.
At the same time, despite the rather thoughtful interaction with the governments of the Central Asian countries, the government of the Russian Federation extremely illogically shot itself in the foot, causing multimillion waves of anti-war migration.
Undoubtedly, the population decline creates other challenges for the Russian government (a decrease in the number of taxpayers, a decrease in the mobilization resource, etc.). However, it is precisely that problem with pension contributions is the problem of today, i.e. the problem that cannot simply be left to the future, the problem that will be noticed by large groups of the population (pensioners and people of pre-retirement age), and it will lead to a sharp explosion of social discontent.
Obviously, in order to solve this problem, the Russian government will have to continue to create new conditions every year to attract new citizens from Central Asia or other regions.
The only alternative to the rapid collapse of the pension system of the Russian Federation in this case is the constant "import" of new citizens who pay pension contributions to previous generations of Russians. The policy of importing "ordinary" labor migrants no longer works in this case.
The review was prepared by the "THREADS" Project team consisting of Khadisha Akayeva (participant of the CABAR.asia School of Analytical Journalism), Bolot Satarkulov, Ilya Barokhovskiy, Adil Turdukulov, Galym Ageleuov.